The paper introduces PACE (Policy‑Attested Contract Execution), a framework that sits between large‑language‑model (LLM) based autonomous AI agents and on‑chain DeFi operations. PACE defines typed transaction intents, a deterministic policy verifier, and signed Policy Decision Records (PDRs) that cryptographically bind an approved intent, policy, and simulation report to the exact on‑chain execution bytes, providing replay and expiration protection. In evaluations across 40 tasks and six baselines, PACE achieves zero unsafe executions and zero false positives, outperforming unguarded agents by a large margin.
By Rabimba Karanjai (Larry), Yang Lu (Larry), Richard Williamson (Larry), Hemanth Hm (Larry), Prakhar Mehrotra (Larry), Lei Xu (Larry), Weidong (Larry), Shi
AcquireBound is a runtime authorization framework that ensures AI agents can safely acquire and activate resources such as compute, credentials, and services. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their capabilities through authenticated evidence, and activates them only after verifying a manifest, provenance, and relational constraints. The system demonstrates strong safety properties, passing extensive benign and unsafe trace tests across multiple resource classes.
By Genliang Zhu
arXiv:2608. 11344v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Financial institutions are delegating consequential decisions to agentic AI systems that decompose goals, coordinate models and tools, and act with little oversight.
By Henry Han
arXiv:2609.14744v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, bud...
By Genliang Zhu (Accentrust, Georgia Institute of Technology), Chu Wang (Accentrust, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
arXiv:2608. 12654v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Long-running LLM agents act through tools, and a single step can send an email, merge a pull request, or wire a payment.
By Oguz Serdar, Cuneyt Mertayak
The paper introduces Runtime Assurance Contracts (RAC) as a formal policy framework for high‑risk AI agents, addressing the "assurance‑transition gap" by binding autonomy boundaries, component eligibility, evidence state, transition policy, human‑review capacity, and non‑compensatory gates. RAC allows soft metrics to influence routing while mandating retries, switches, escalations, deferrals, or stops when mandatory gates fail or are unknown, ensuring aggregate performance cannot alone authorize action. The authors define the contract, evidence record, permission rule, and five invariants, and evaluate RAC through deterministic failure‑injection studies, hand‑authored traces, and a prospective synthetic holdout, comparing it to score‑only and restricted protocol baselines.
By Serhii Zabolotnii
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.
By Genliang Zhu (Accentrust, Georgia Institute of Technology), Chu Wang (Accentrust, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
The paper investigates a critical flaw in AI coding-agent systems such as Claude Code, Codex CLI, and Cursor, where the action approved by a human is not the same as the action executed by the harness. It introduces the concept of Approval Laundering, categorizing six systematic failure modes—Scope, Argument, Temporal, Tool, Delegation, and Semantic laundering—and demonstrates these failures through controlled experiments. The authors propose an Approval Token mechanism that mitigates some laundering types but leaves others unaffected, highlighting the limitations of current enforcement strategies.
By Yang Wang
The paper introduces Aegis, a runtime governance system for agentic AI that treats model outputs as action proposals and mediates them through a trusted decision layer before tool execution. Aegis evaluates proposals against active policy, resolves provenance server‑side, fails closed under uncertainty, and routes selected cases through a Senate‑style settlement process. In a sandbox evaluation across 6,300 rows, Aegis prevented all governed mock‑tool applications and risky side‑effect completions, preserving provenance and quorum evidence for all settled cases.
By Adam Mazzocchetti
The paper "Beyond Training: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Inference-Time AI Governance" presents a taxonomy of twenty inference‑time mechanisms for monitoring, verification, and enforcement, each evaluated on a four‑point readiness scale using evidence from four vendors. It applies this taxonomy to a two‑dimensional adversary model and maps the mechanisms to four governance scenarios, finding that most mechanisms are commercially available but only adequate against cooperative or low‑to‑medium‑capability users, not high‑capability state‑level deployers. The study also links inference‑stage controls to hardware‑stage mechanisms through a substitution principle and reports a second‑rater reliability of 0.74.
whyItMatters":"The work identifies the current gaps and readiness of inference‑time governance tools, highlighting that existing mechanisms are insufficient against powerful adversaries and thus informing future regulatory and technical development."
By Samar Ansari
arXiv:2606. 04104v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent systems execute through runtimes with very different control points: local coding tools, framework SDKs, managed agent platforms, API gateways, and observer-only integrations.
By Zexun Wang
The paper introduces PACT, a benchmark designed to evaluate how well enterprise AI assistants follow compliance rules when faced with various pressures such as persistent users or hurried managers. PACT covers twelve regulated domains and forty-eight realistic multi‑turn scenarios, pairing each rule with a shortcut that violates it and applying different pressures across wording and system‑prompt modes. Using PACT, the authors profile six metrics of compliance and aggregate them into a PACTScore, revealing significant variability among 22 LLM models and that even top performers misapply rules 6–10% of the time, with user pressure increasing violations by 65% on average.
By Mika Okamoto, Ansel Kaplan Erol