Authorization Revocation for Long-Running AI Agents: Root-Scoped Quiescence under Delegation and Asynchronous Execution
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arXiv:2608.30091v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern agent frameworks compose planners, tool agents, remote services, and shared specialists into runtime delegation graphs, but their revocation API...
arXiv:2609.14744v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, bud...
arXiv:2608.21159v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using AI agents turn delegated tasks into provider effects, yet authorization often ends at admission while provider state, delivery, retry, and...
AcquireBound is a runtime authorization framework that ensures AI agents can safely acquire and activate resources such as compute, credentials, and services. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their capabilities through authenticated evidence, and activates them only after verifying a manifest, provenance, and relational constraints. The system demonstrates strong safety properties, passing extensive benign and unsafe trace tests across multiple resource classes.
arXiv:2608. 11632v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persistent AI agents accumulate versioned state across long horizons, but storage retention alone does not identify authoritative state.
arXiv:2607. 10487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents can commit durable effects from authority evidence that was valid earlier in execution: a DOM snapshot, approval epoch, version witness, branch token, or worker result.