arXiv:2608.30091v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern agent frameworks compose planners, tool agents, remote services, and shared specialists into runtime delegation graphs, but their revocation API...
arXiv:2609.14744v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, bud...
arXiv:2608.21159v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using AI agents turn delegated tasks into provider effects, yet authorization often ends at admission while provider state, delivery, retry, and...
AcquireBound is a runtime authorization framework that ensures AI agents can safely acquire and activate resources such as compute, credentials, and services. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their capabilities through authenticated evidence, and activates them only after verifying a manifest, provenance, and relational constraints. The system demonstrates strong safety properties, passing extensive benign and unsafe trace tests across multiple resource classes.
arXiv:2608. 11632v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persistent AI agents accumulate versioned state across long horizons, but storage retention alone does not identify authoritative state.
arXiv:2607. 10487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents can commit durable effects from authority evidence that was valid earlier in execution: a DOM snapshot, approval epoch, version witness, branch token, or worker result.
arXiv:2606. 22504v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Coding agents often receive broad tool access for an entire task, even when a resource is needed only for one subgoal.
arXiv:2609.08062v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using language agents can delegate and revoke permissions while acting through external services. We show that two authorization histories can hav...
arXiv:2609. 00546v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent systems are commonly described by the model and harness that currently produce their behavior.
The paper introduces PACE (Policy‑Attested Contract Execution), a framework that sits between large‑language‑model (LLM) based autonomous AI agents and on‑chain DeFi operations. PACE defines typed transaction intents, a deterministic policy verifier, and signed Policy Decision Records (PDRs) that cryptographically bind an approved intent, policy, and simulation report to the exact on‑chain execution bytes, providing replay and expiration protection. In evaluations across 40 tasks and six baselines, PACE achieves zero unsafe executions and zero false positives, outperforming unguarded agents by a large margin.
ClosureBound is a reference monitor that enforces authorization boundaries for agent skills by binding each grant to an exact dependency closure, effect ceiling, purpose, validity, and epochs. It resolves typed graph nodes, normalizes operations into an external‑effect IR, and admits actions only when a joint witness satisfies all bounds, ensuring metadata non‑authority, closure determinism, and other security properties. Empirical evaluation on 549 public skills shows many lack proper dependency declarations, underscoring the need for conservative closure discovery and broader runtime validation.
arXiv:2606. 11632v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic infrastructure introduces a critical control-plane authorization problem: non-deterministic reasoning systems can propose high-stakes mutations to production resources, yet existing security mechanisms -- such as identity and access management (IAM), policy engines, consensus protocols, and audit logs -- either enforce static, context-unaware permissions or merely record actions post-execution.