arXiv:2608.30091v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Modern agent frameworks compose planners, tool agents, remote services, and shared specialists into runtime delegation graphs, but their revocation API...
By Lifei Liu, Haoran Yu, Xiaochong Jiang
arXiv:2609.14744v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, bud...
By Genliang Zhu (Accentrust, Georgia Institute of Technology), Chu Wang (Accentrust, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
The paper introduces "authorization succession," a framework that preserves authority across self‑modifying AI agent populations that can replace, fork, or roll back. It defines a protocol binding each generation to a manifest, root, unique parent, lineage, and population sequence, and establishes invariants that control root‑lifetime consumption and population exposure. The authors prove properties such as population‑safe succession, fork conservation, and rollback non‑reminting, and validate the approach with an executable evaluation covering 32 decisions and external adapters for two mutation systems.
By Genliang Zhu, Chu Wang
arXiv:2608.21159v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Tool-using AI agents turn delegated tasks into provider effects, yet authorization often ends at admission while provider state, delivery, retry, and...
By Yingzhe Tong, Leyu Dai, Songhui Guo
AcquireBound is a runtime authorization framework that ensures AI agents can safely acquire and activate resources such as compute, credentials, and services. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their capabilities through authenticated evidence, and activates them only after verifying a manifest, provenance, and relational constraints. The system demonstrates strong safety properties, passing extensive benign and unsafe trace tests across multiple resource classes.
By Genliang Zhu
arXiv:2608. 11632v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persistent AI agents accumulate versioned state across long horizons, but storage retention alone does not identify authoritative state.
By Jun He, Deying Yu
arXiv:2607. 10487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents can commit durable effects from authority evidence that was valid earlier in execution: a DOM snapshot, approval epoch, version witness, branch token, or worker result.
By Igor Santos-Grueiro
arXiv:2606. 22504v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Coding agents often receive broad tool access for an entire task, even when a resource is needed only for one subgoal.
By Igor Santos-Grueiro
arXiv:2609.08062v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Tool-using language agents can delegate and revoke permissions while acting through external services. We show that two authorization histories can hav...
By Moonwon Choi, Seokho Jeong, Seunggeun Lee
The paper introduces a protocol for cross‑interface authorization of AI computer‑use agents, ensuring that policy decisions remain consistent across graphical interfaces, command lines, APIs, scripts, and Model Context Protocol servers. It defines a profile‑bounded system that enumerates all effect‑bearing routes, normalizes requests to canonical effects, issues prepare tickets, and re‑verifies all relevant state at commit time, requiring a sink receipt for a committed result. Extensive testing across two runtime mappings produced thousands of traces, with rigorous checks confirming no semantic regressions, mutant rejections, and correct outcome matching.
By Genliang Zhu, Chu Wang
The paper introduces a fault‑tolerant budget conservation framework for distributed multi‑agent delegation, where budgets are represented as exclusive escrow credits that traverse a delegation DAG. It details how each branch converts credit into a reservation tied to lineage, epoch, and idempotency, persists a signed dispatch permit, and ensures that uncertain effects remain charged until settlement or retirement. The authors prove properties such as ownership partition, ledger conservation, and at‑most‑once settlement, and validate the mechanism through TLA+ checks, a JavaScript explorer, and crash‑injected SQLite experiments.
By Genliang Zhu, Chu Wang
The paper introduces the Secret-Use Delegation Protocol (SUDP), a method for agentic systems to perform user-authorized operations without granting reusable authority to untrusted requesters. It formalizes the Agent Secret Use (ASU) problem, outlines seven required security properties, and demonstrates that SUDP satisfies six of them under standard cryptographic assumptions, with the remaining property addressed via hardware-rooted runtime composition. A reference implementation shows minimal overhead for mediated calls.
By Xiaohang Yu, Hejia Geng, Xinmeng Zeng, William Knottenbelt