arXiv:2608. 07538v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents move from decision support to autonomous procurement, firms need to know whether delegated negotiators create value, divide it predictably, and avoid money-losing contracts.
By Chen Liang, Fasheng Xu
arXiv:2606. 03034v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents have begun to delegate work to one another.
By Gaurav Naresh Mittal
arXiv:2608. 07583v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent LLM systems route among model-backed advisors, yet a deployer rarely knows before shipping whether routing will help at all.
By Anchen Sun, Kaiqi Yang
arXiv:2605. 13909v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation.
By Erica Zhang, Fangzhao Zhang, Aneesh Pappu, Batu El, Jose Blanchet, Susan Athey, Jiashuo Liu, James Zou
The paper examines how an agent’s probability report is evaluated twice—once by a strictly proper scoring rule and again by an approval rule that determines a decision. It shows that when the approval rule is welfare‑maximizing, it cannot be affine, yet the resulting distortion is predictable and can be mitigated by a reserve report that neutralizes the cost of pretending to be the marginal type. A Lipschitz rule with a single kink achieves first‑best welfare, while smooth rules cannot, and the key constraint is the steepness of the rule rather than its smoothness.
By Lauri Lov\'en, Sasu Tarkoma
arXiv:2607. 10202v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cross-model comparisons read divergence in value dispositions as evidence that language models hold individuated values.
By Hong-In Won, Jinseok Jang, Hyoseop Kim