The paper investigates proportional representation in a temporal voting setting where a single candidate is chosen each round and voters submit ranked preferences that may evolve over time. It extends classic proportionality axioms—justified representation (JR), proportional JR (PJR), extended JR (EJR), and proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC)—to accommodate various ways of determining which top-ranked candidates are considered approved, ranging from a fixed common cutoff to individual, round‑specific cutoffs. The authors analyze which axioms can be guaranteed under different informational assumptions about future rounds, showing that while EJR is unattainable, JR, PJR, and PSC can be achieved with a fixed cutoff if all preferences are known in advance; varying cutoffs reduce guarantees, yet PJR can still be achieved efficiently for groups that agree in every round, and PSC can be satisfied without future knowledge. They also demonstrate that checking these axioms is often coNP‑complete, though some stronger axioms may be easier to verify.
By Noam Hazon, Leora Schmerler, Nicholas Teh
arXiv:2503. 01985v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In the classic committee election setting each voter approves a subset of candidates and the goal is to select $k$ winners based on these preferences.
By Sonja Kraiczy, Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Grzegorz Pierczy\'nski, Piotr Skowron
arXiv:2606. 23853v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called $\textit{social decision frames}$: finite sets of voters equipped with distinguished families of coalitions interpreted as those voting blocs evaluated to form a strict majority.
By Lawrence S. Moss, Arthur Paul Pedersen
The paper proposes a transparent, user‑configurable rule for selecting arguments in deliberative polls, replacing opaque learned rankers. It formalises argument selection over bipolar justification sets, introduces seven civic recommender criteria, and presents a one‑hop reversed endorsement flow rule that meets them. Experiments on 17,000 simulated runs show the rule performs comparably to random on coverage but outperforms other methods on endorsement mass and robustness under adversarial pressure.
By Muntaser Syed, Markus Zanker, Marius Silaghi
This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called $\textit{social decision frames}$: finite sets of voters equipped with distinguished families of coalitions interpreted as those voting blocs evaluated to form a strict majority. A coherence criterion for qualitative majority judgments is identified and shown to give an exact characterization for representability of strict majorities by finitely additive measures.
arXiv:2608. 11500v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest known satisfiable proportionality axioms for approval-based committee elections.
By Nicholas Teh
arXiv:2606. 30116v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Pairwise preference data is widely used for training and evaluating language models (e.
By Eleanor Clifford, Michael Amir, Arduin Findeis, Aaron Zhao, Robert Mullins
arXiv:2606. 11692v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deliberative polling promises to improve collective decision-making by exposing shareholders to a broad range of arguments before they vote.
By Rwaida Alssadi, Khulud Alawaji, Balaji Kasula, Muntaser Syed, Badria Alfurhood, Markus Zanker, Marius Silaghi
The paper introduces GUARD, a neuro‑symbolic system that autoformalizes argumentative material by completing missing premises (guards) before formal verification. It uses large language models to generate candidate guards, Isabelle/HOL to verify them, and a contrastive test to ensure the proof depends on the original premises and does not over‑generalize. Experiments on Debatepedia and ARCT show that GUARD improves verified‑faithful scores by over 30 points and reduces leakage by about 20 points compared to prior LLM‑driven theorem proving methods.
By Xin Quan, Reto Gubelmann, Andr\'e Freitas
arXiv:2605. 13362v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Computational social choice and algorithmic decision theory offer rich aggregation theory but no end-to-end process for egalitarian self-governance: aggregation, deliberation, amendment, and consensus are each considered in isolation, with key metric-space aggregators being NP-hard.
By Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon
The paper proposes a theory for judging post-hoc debates in AI, focusing on properties like reproducibility, robustness, groundedness, and explainability. It evaluates two debate‑judgement methods—LLM judges and formal computational argumentation semantics—finding similar accuracy but noting that argumentation semantics offers stronger formal guarantees. The study suggests that argumentation semantics is a preferable framework for principled debate judges in AI systems.
By Xiang Yin, Adam Dejl, Antonio Rago, Lihu Chen, Francesca Toni
arXiv:2505. 18492v5 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Mathematical competition problems fall into two broad types: theorem proving, which asks for a proof of a given statement, and answer construction, which requires constructing a property-satifying object with proofs.
By Jialiang Sun, Yuzhi Tang, Ao Li, Chris J. Maddison, Kuldeep S. Meel