arXiv:2503. 01985v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In the classic committee election setting each voter approves a subset of candidates and the goal is to select $k$ winners based on these preferences.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2606. 23853v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called $\textit{social decision frames}$: finite sets of voters equipped with distinguished families of coalitions interpreted as those voting blocs evaluated to form a strict majority.
This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called $\textit{social decision frames}$: finite sets of voters equipped with distinguished families of coalitions interpreted as those voting blocs evaluated to form a strict majority. A coherence criterion for qualitative majority judgments is identified and shown to give an exact characterization for representability of strict majorities by finitely additive measures.
arXiv:2608. 11500v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest known satisfiable proportionality axioms for approval-based committee elections.
arXiv:2606. 11692v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deliberative polling promises to improve collective decision-making by exposing shareholders to a broad range of arguments before they vote.
arXiv:2606. 08098v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Majority voting over sampled answers is the dominant unsupervised aggregator for multi-sample LLM inference.
arXiv:2601. 23221v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As acquiring reliable ground-truth labels is usually costly, or infeasible, crowdsourcing and aggregation of noisy human annotations is the typical resort.