arXiv AI
Multi-Winner Voting with Argumentative Ballots
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arXiv AI
6d ago
Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting with Ranked Preferences
The paper investigates proportional representation in a temporal voting setting where a single candidate is chosen each round and voters submit ranked preferences that may evolve over time. It extends classic proportionality axioms—justified representation (JR), proportional JR (PJR), extended JR (EJR), and proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC)—to accommodate various ways of determining which top-ranked candidates are considered approved, ranging from a fixed common cutoff to individual, round‑specific cutoffs. The authors analyze which axioms can be guaranteed under different informational assumptions about future rounds, showing that while EJR is unattainable, JR, PJR, and PSC can be achieved with a fixed cutoff if all preferences are known in advance; varying cutoffs reduce guarantees, yet PJR can still be achieved efficiently for groups that agree in every round, and PSC can be satisfied without future knowledge. They also demonstrate that checking these axioms is often coNP‑complete, though some stronger axioms may be easier to verify.
arXiv AI
Aug 13
Proportional Committee Elections with Positive and Negative Votes
arXiv:2503. 01985v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In the classic committee election setting each voter approves a subset of candidates and the goal is to select $k$ winners based on these preferences.
arXiv AI
Jun 24
The Measurable Majority
arXiv:2606. 23853v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called $\textit{social decision frames}$: finite sets of voters equipped with distinguished families of coalitions interpreted as those voting blocs evaluated to form a strict majority.
arXiv AI
Aug 26
Rules Before Oracles: Auditable, User-Configurable Argument Selection for Deliberative Polling
The paper proposes a transparent, user‑configurable rule for selecting arguments in deliberative polls, replacing opaque learned rankers. It formalises argument selection over bipolar justification sets, introduces seven civic recommender criteria, and presents a one‑hop reversed endorsement flow rule that meets them. Experiments on 17,000 simulated runs show the rule performs comparably to random on coverage but outperforms other methods on endorsement mass and robustness under adversarial pressure.
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jun 22
The Measurable Majority
This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called $\textit{social decision frames}$: finite sets of voters equipped with distinguished families of coalitions interpreted as those voting blocs evaluated to form a strict majority. A coherence criterion for qualitative majority judgments is identified and shown to give an exact characterization for representability of strict majorities by finitely additive measures.
arXiv AI
Aug 13
Strengthening Full Justified Representation: Efficient Verification and Computation
arXiv:2608. 11500v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest known satisfiable proportionality axioms for approval-based committee elections.