arXiv AI By Zhicheng Lin

Six misconceptions about large language models: A minimal model and diagnostic taxonomy

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The article presents a minimal working model for large language model (LLM) systems, emphasizing four key distinctions—pretraining vs. deployment, distribution vs. samples, types of memory, and task competence vs. agency. Using this framework, it diagnoses six common misconceptions about LLMs (next‑token prediction, regression to the mean, training‑data regurgitation, model memory, alignment, and understanding), explaining what each misconception captures correctly, where it conflates distinctions, and the implications for evaluation, design, and governance. The model is applied to AI policy language, illustrating how policy can misrepresent these distinctions and offering a diagnostic toolkit to correct such errors.

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