arXiv:2608.29596v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Autonomous large language model (LLM) agents increasingly face reliability, context consumption, and execution stability bottlenecks when deployed on c...
By Sanket Badhe, Deep Shah, Priyanka Tiwari, Nehal Kathrotia
The paper introduces skilder, a framework that organizes LLM agent capabilities into role‑scoped bundles of skills, tools, and instructions, with explicit limits. Agents start with a minimal role catalog, discover the roles needed for a task, and receive the associated tools only through a single MCP server, ensuring deterministic enforcement of scope. Experiments on 13 tasks with six models show that skilder’s authorization layer prevents unauthorized tool calls and parameter violations while maintaining flexibility through dynamic cross‑role capability acquisition.
By Michael Stettler, Benjamin Girardet, Jonas Canton, Nicolas Corod
The paper introduces AgentLeak, a black‑box attack that clones the task‑solving capabilities of a strong LLM agent onto a weaker one by exploiting differences between successful and failed executions. Unlike prior skill‑stealing methods that only recover explicit skill artifacts, AgentLeak identifies and incorporates missing procedural behaviors, boosting task pass rates by over 40% and closing more than 80% of the capability gap across 20 scenarios. The study demonstrates that observable execution behavior can leak proprietary procedural knowledge, posing a confidentiality risk for LLM agents.
By Xiaoting Lyu, Yuhong Wu, Yufei Han, Shichang Liu, Liang Zhang, Bin Wang, Bin Wang, Xiaobo Ma, Wei Wang
arXiv:2609.33772v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Executable environments are critical for post-training agents on tasks that require tool use and multi-step interaction, but constructing executabl...
By Weiyi Xu, Xiaowen Yang, Wen Da, Hang Xu, Canwei Li, Hongjie You, Pusen Dong, Yucheng Zeng, Zhaokai Luo, Mu Chuan
ClawSentry is an open‑source, framework‑agnostic security supervision gateway designed to protect autonomous large language model (LLM) agents from progressive risks that can arise at four points in the agent control loop: skill admission, invocation‑time intent, execution‑time effect, and post‑action consequence. It introduces a multi‑tier decision engine—deterministic L1, rule‑anchored L2, and read‑only L3—alongside a First‑Use Skill Package Review (FSPR) and an Agent Harness Protocol (AHP) that applies a single policy across multiple agent runtimes without modifying their internals. Evaluation on SkillInject and the SkillsSafety benchmark shows that ClawSentry significantly reduces contextual adversarial skill risk (ASR) while maintaining high task success rates (TSR).
By Kai Wang, Zeming Wei, BiaoJie Zeng, Chang Jin, An Wang, Xiaokun Luan, Zhixiao Lin, Jingjing Qu, Xia Hu, Xingcheng Xu
arXiv:2607. 25032v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent Skills are an emerging way to extend large language model agents with reusable procedural knowledge that the agent loads on demand.
By Giuseppe Destefanis