arXiv:2606. 14517v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based guardrails have emerged as a highly effective defense against prompt injection and jailbreak attacks in autonomous agents.
By Yuguang Zhou, Xunguang Wang, Pingchuan Ma, Zhantong Xue, Zhaoyu Wang, Shuai Wang
The paper proposes universal, tool‑based defenses for large language model agents that use external tools, addressing four types of adversarial attacks: direct and indirect prompt injection, memory poisoning, and backdoor attacks. Two main defenses are introduced: Attacker Tool Filtering, which uses anomaly detection to remove suspicious tools, and Normal Tool Recalling, which restores the agent’s original toolset before planning. The authors also add prompt‑based defenses such as Chain‑of‑Thought prompting and self‑reflection, and demonstrate that these methods dramatically lower attack success rates—often to 0%—across multiple open‑source and proprietary LLMs while maintaining or improving task performance.
By Xiaoyan Li, Yunli Wang
arXiv:2608. 10669v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents combine language-based reasoning with external tools to perform complex tasks.
By Zixing Chen, Xingyuan Liu, Jie Zhu, Huaixia Dou, Shuo Jiang, Junhui Li, Lifan Guo, Feng Chen, Chi Zhang
arXiv:2606. 24589v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Scaling adversarial evaluation of large language models requires both a method for generating hard inputs and a reliable way to confirm that resulting failures are real.
By Khanak Khandelwal (Indian Institute of Technology Jodhpur)
arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.
By Hiskias Dingeto, Will Leeney
arXiv:2609.36570v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that...
By Mark Russinovich