arXiv AI By Khanak Khandelwal (Indian Institute of Technology Jodhpur)

AdversaBench: Automated LLM Red-Teaming with Multi-Judge Confirmation and Cross-Model Transferability

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arXiv:2606. 24589v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Scaling adversarial evaluation of large language models requires both a method for generating hard inputs and a reliable way to confirm that resulting failures are real.

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