arXiv AI

From Shield to Target: Denial-of-Service Attacks on LLM-Based Agent Guardrails

arXiv:2606. 14517v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based guardrails have emerged as a highly effective defense against prompt injection and jailbreak attacks in autonomous agents.

arXiv AI
Jun 12

Who Pays the Price? Stakeholder-Centric Prompt Injection Benchmarking for Real-world Web Agents

arXiv:2606. 13385v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Web agents driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world environments, where they operate over untrusted web content and execute actions with direct consequences.

By Zihao Wang, Yiming Li, Yutong Wu, Zheyu Liu, Kangjie Chen, Fok Kar Wai, Pin-Yu Chen, Vrizlynn L. L. Thing, Bo Li, Dacheng Tao, Tianwei Zhang
arXiv AI
Jun 12

The Emergence of Autonomous Penetration Capabilities in Large Language Model-Powered AI Systems

arXiv:2606. 13079v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Nowadays, the autonomous execution of cyberattacks capable of causing substantial real-world harm is widely regarded as one of the critical red lines that frontier AI systems must not cross.

By Jiaqi Luo, Jiarun Dai, Zhile Chen, Jia Xu, Weibing Wang, Yawen Duan, Brian Tse, Geng Hong, Xudong Pan, Yuan Zhang, Min Yang
arXiv AI
Jun 2

AgentRedBench: Dynamic Redteaming and Integration-Aware Defense for LLM Agents over SaaS Integrations

arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.

By Hiskias Dingeto, Will Leeney
arXiv AI
Jun 17

Breaking the Code: Security Assessment of AI Code Agents Through Systematic Jailbreaking Attacks

arXiv:2510. 01359v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Code-capable large language model (LLM) agents are embedded in software engineering workflows where they can read, write, and execute code, raising "jailbreak" stakes beyond text-only settings.

By Shoumik Saha, Jifan Chen, Sam Mayers, Sanjay Krishna Gouda, Zijian Wang, Varun Kumar
arXiv AI
Jul 14

Mako: A Self-Evolving Agentic Operating System (SE-AOS) for Autonomous Web Exploitation

arXiv:2607. 11288v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We introduce the Self-Evolving Agentic Operating System (SE-AOS): a new class of AI agent that treats exploit capability as a mutable, versioned kernel it extends at runtime, observing its own failures, synthesising new capabilities, proving them against a live target, and hot-loading them back into itself.

By Praneeth Narisetty, Shiva Nagendra Babu Kore