This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called $\textit{social decision frames}$: finite sets of voters equipped with distinguished families of coalitions interpreted as those voting blocs evaluated to form a strict majority. A coherence criterion for qualitative majority judgments is identified and shown to give an exact characterization for representability of strict majorities by finitely additive measures.
arXiv:2503. 01985v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In the classic committee election setting each voter approves a subset of candidates and the goal is to select $k$ winners based on these preferences.
By Sonja Kraiczy, Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Grzegorz Pierczy\'nski, Piotr Skowron
arXiv:2608.23247v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: We introduce multi-winner voting with argumentative ballots (MVArg) and investigate theoretical properties. As our conceptual contribution, we genera...
By Ryuta Arisaka, Hirotaka Ono
The paper investigates proportional representation in a temporal voting setting where a single candidate is chosen each round and voters submit ranked preferences that may evolve over time. It extends classic proportionality axioms—justified representation (JR), proportional JR (PJR), extended JR (EJR), and proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC)—to accommodate various ways of determining which top-ranked candidates are considered approved, ranging from a fixed common cutoff to individual, round‑specific cutoffs. The authors analyze which axioms can be guaranteed under different informational assumptions about future rounds, showing that while EJR is unattainable, JR, PJR, and PSC can be achieved with a fixed cutoff if all preferences are known in advance; varying cutoffs reduce guarantees, yet PJR can still be achieved efficiently for groups that agree in every round, and PSC can be satisfied without future knowledge. They also demonstrate that checking these axioms is often coNP‑complete, though some stronger axioms may be easier to verify.
By Noam Hazon, Leora Schmerler, Nicholas Teh
The paper proposes a transparent, user‑configurable rule for selecting arguments in deliberative polls, replacing opaque learned rankers. It formalises argument selection over bipolar justification sets, introduces seven civic recommender criteria, and presents a one‑hop reversed endorsement flow rule that meets them. Experiments on 17,000 simulated runs show the rule performs comparably to random on coverage but outperforms other methods on endorsement mass and robustness under adversarial pressure.
By Muntaser Syed, Markus Zanker, Marius Silaghi
arXiv:2610.00577v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: In a district-based election, N voters are partitioned into k districts, and each voter votes for one of m candidates. Each district elects a winner...
By Koustav De, Debajyoti Kar, Swagato Sanyal