arXiv AI
Kill-Chain Canaries: Stage-Level Tracking of Prompt Injection Across Attack Surfaces and Five Production LLMs
Read the original on arXiv AI →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
Related stories
arXiv AI
Sep 30
CounterSteer: Suppressing Indirect Prompt Injection with Activation Steering
arXiv:2609.36570v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that...
arXiv AI
Jun 18
LivePI: More Realistic Benchmarking of Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection
arXiv:2605. 17986v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents such as OpenClaw are increasingly deployed in local workflows with access to external tools.
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 22
Defusing Explosive Prompts: Understanding and Preventing Trigger-Based Prompt Injections in LLM Agents
arXiv:2609.22510v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLM applications integrate with external tools, they are increasingly exposed to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where adversarial instructions a...
arXiv AI
Aug 5
Injection-Execution Dissociation: A Mechanistic Evaluation of Persistent Memory Attacks and Defenses in Stateful LLM Agents
arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 14
NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operations
arXiv:2607. 10490v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are attractive for network operations, but tickets, alerts, logs, runbooks, and ChatOps messages can carry indirect prompt injections.
arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 22
Beyond Single-Model Injection: A Threat Model and Defense Architecture for Prompt Injection in Multi-Agent Systems
arXiv:2609.22949v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Existing prompt injection research focuses on single-model chatbot scenarios, where an attacker manipulates one LLM through crafted input. Multi-agen...