arXiv:2609.36570v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that...
By Mark Russinovich
The paper introduces a new benchmark for indirect prompt injection (IPI) that focuses on attacks which tamper with decisions already in progress rather than redirecting the task. In 90 validated cases across three tool‑use environments, attackers target up to six aspects of an agent’s decision‑making—objective, decision rules, available actions, expected consequences, observation reading, or state beliefs—while keeping the original task intact. The study finds that many defenses reduce objective‑targeting attacks but leave observation and state attacks largely effective, highlighting gaps in current mitigation strategies.
By Rongting Zhang, Martin Bertran, Sandeep Avula, Chia-Jung Lee, Vanessa Murdock
arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
By Jun Wen Leong
INFUSE is a new benchmark that tests indirect prompt injection (IPI) in large‑language‑model agents performing long‑horizon workflows. It contains 40 realistic tasks and 56 attack scenarios across five threat categories, with attacks injected through realistic interaction surfaces rather than just initial prompts. The study evaluated 19 LLMs, generating over 41,000 adversarial trajectories and found mean attack success rates of 19.6% (LLM evaluation) and 15.4% (heuristic verification), while prompt‑level hardening reduced success from 58.2% to 14.3%.
By Thuy Dung Nguyen, Jingyi Guo, Rana Seda Dubauskas, Sreepriya Damuluru, Taylor T. Johnson, Kevin Leach
arXiv:2605. 30837v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Prompt-injection detectors are heterogeneous: each is strong on a different slice of attacks, and none is always reliable.
By Shuhao Zhang, Jiarui Li, Qi Cao, Ruiyi Zhang, Pengtao Xie
AgentSentry is an inference‑time defense for tool‑augmented large language model agents that mitigates indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. It uses temporal causal diagnostics by performing counterfactual re‑executions at tool‑return boundaries to detect mediator‑sensitive proposals, purifies implicated content, and resumes execution from a sanitized state. Evaluations on AgentDojo show zero successful attacks (ASR = 0%) and an average Utility Under Attack of 76.10%, outperforming baselines while maintaining low false‑positive rates.
By Tian Zhang, Yiwei Xu, Juan Wang, Keyan Guo, Xiaoyang Xu, Bowen Xiao, Quanlong Guan, Jinlin Fan, Jiawei Liu, Zhiquan Liu, Hongxin Hu
arXiv:2605. 17986v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents such as OpenClaw are increasingly deployed in local workflows with access to external tools.
By Lei Zhao, Abhay Bhaskar, Edgar Dobriban
arXiv:2610.28425v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Modern LLM agents persist state across sessions via two channels: long-lived memory files silently prepended to the system prompt, and scheduled task...
By Zhiyue Xu, Xukai Wang, Zhiyuan Huang, Mingjie Zhan, Jian Zhao, Xu-Yao Zhang
arXiv:2610. 37657v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We introduce Heads of Security (HoS), a prompt injection defense that enforces instruction-data separation via a small set of learned per-head attention gates.
By Igor Shilov, Xiaoxue Yang, Alexander Panfilov, Evgenii Kortukov, Matthieu Meeus, Peter Romov, Wojciech Samek, Jonas Geiping, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye
arXiv:2606. 15057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents.
By Xinhang Ma, Taoran Li, Chaowei Xiao, Zhiyuan Yu, Ning Zhang, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
arXiv:2606. 07943v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks.
By Haochang Hao, Dehai Min, Zhifang Zhang, Yunbei Zhang, Miao Xu, Yingqiang Ge, Lu Cheng
arXiv:2605. 08442v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Persistent memory attacks against LLM agents achieve high attack success rates against open-source models.
By Jun Wen Leong