arXiv Machine Learning By Ruksat Khan Shayoni, Muhammad Faraz Shoaib, S M Asif Hossain, M. F. Mridha

NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operations

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arXiv:2607. 10490v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are attractive for network operations, but tickets, alerts, logs, runbooks, and ChatOps messages can carry indirect prompt injections.

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