Defusing Explosive Prompts: Understanding and Preventing Trigger-Based Prompt Injections in LLM Agents
Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Machine Learning.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Machine Learning.
arXiv:2609.36570v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that...
The paper introduces a new benchmark for indirect prompt injection (IPI) that focuses on attacks which tamper with decisions already in progress rather than redirecting the task. In 90 validated cases across three tool‑use environments, attackers target up to six aspects of an agent’s decision‑making—objective, decision rules, available actions, expected consequences, observation reading, or state beliefs—while keeping the original task intact. The study finds that many defenses reduce objective‑targeting attacks but leave observation and state attacks largely effective, highlighting gaps in current mitigation strategies.
arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
INFUSE is a new benchmark that tests indirect prompt injection (IPI) in large‑language‑model agents performing long‑horizon workflows. It contains 40 realistic tasks and 56 attack scenarios across five threat categories, with attacks injected through realistic interaction surfaces rather than just initial prompts. The study evaluated 19 LLMs, generating over 41,000 adversarial trajectories and found mean attack success rates of 19.6% (LLM evaluation) and 15.4% (heuristic verification), while prompt‑level hardening reduced success from 58.2% to 14.3%.
arXiv:2605. 30837v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Prompt-injection detectors are heterogeneous: each is strong on a different slice of attacks, and none is always reliable.
AgentSentry is an inference‑time defense for tool‑augmented large language model agents that mitigates indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. It uses temporal causal diagnostics by performing counterfactual re‑executions at tool‑return boundaries to detect mediator‑sensitive proposals, purifies implicated content, and resumes execution from a sanitized state. Evaluations on AgentDojo show zero successful attacks (ASR = 0%) and an average Utility Under Attack of 76.10%, outperforming baselines while maintaining low false‑positive rates.