Jev-Guard: Fast Routing and Auditing Agent Actions over Editable Policy Trees
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StepGuard introduces a step-level guard model that audits and checks tool actions before execution, addressing security risks in LLM-based agents. It is trained using StepGen, an automatic engine that generates safe and unsafe trajectories, and employs Balance-GRPO to dynamically balance learning between safe and unsafe actions. Experiments show StepGuard achieves high accuracy comparable to GPT-5.4 and significantly reduces attack success rates while minimally impacting utility.
arXiv:2606. 29887v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In real-world applications, guardrails are often expected to identify unsafe user-model interactions according to application-specific safety policies, rather than relying on predefined risk taxonomies.
VEPA is a framework that enables the verified evolution of formal guardrails for lifelong large language model agents. It represents guardrails as formal policies of symbolic rules over typed agent events, and during deployment uses LLM‑guided feedback to propose policy patches that fix new failures while preserving correct behavior. A deterministic verifier accepts only structurally valid, conflict‑free policies, and an evidence‑aware authority layer activates verified rules only when sufficient supporting evidence exists, ensuring that uncertain updates do not directly affect guardrail decisions.
arXiv:2607. 19356v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using LLM agents increasingly execute high-impact actions, making runtime safety monitoring essential.
arXiv:2609.00015v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents powered by large language models are evolving from isolated assistants into heterogeneous systems in which multiple agents, planners, control...
Guard models are used to prevent LLM agents from performing forbidden actions, but this alone does not guarantee safety. The paper shows that many agent trajectories contain unfulfilled safety‑critical obligations—actions that should have been performed—highlighting a new source of risk. To address this, the authors introduce ObligationBench, a benchmark of 240 expert‑validated trajectories, and develop ObligationGuard, a model that improves obligation detection recall and exact‑match rates over existing models.