arXiv:2606. 12797v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic large language model systems that autonomously invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, and execute multi-step plans are increasingly deployed in public-facing domains, including government services, healthcare triage, and financial advising.
MAS-Guard is a unified framework designed to safeguard both single- and multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems. It introduces a local Agent Guardrail (A-Guard) layer that uses task-specific experts to evaluate agentic events, and a system-level Control Plane that applies deterministic structural checks and semantic assessments to routes, capabilities, and message content. The framework enforces interventions—allow, reflection, confirmation, and block—across benchmarks, reducing attack success rates by 71.5‑86.3% while maintaining utility on benign tasks.
The paper introduces Aegis, a runtime governance system for agentic AI that treats model outputs as action proposals and mediates them through a trusted decision layer before tool execution. Aegis evaluates proposals against active policy, resolves provenance server‑side, fails closed under uncertainty, and routes selected cases through a Senate‑style settlement process. In a sandbox evaluation across 6,300 rows, Aegis prevented all governed mock‑tool applications and risky side‑effect completions, preserving provenance and quorum evidence for all settled cases.
arXiv:2608. 13574v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly operate as execution systems that invoke tools, modify local state, use persistent memory, and interact with external protocols.
arXiv:2609.35807v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents can make unsafe tool calls even when instructed to behave safely. Existing defenses constrain agents before execution, modify tool inputs/...
AgentKernel proposes a trust‑native operating system for AI agents, arguing that current governance layers are insufficient because they share the same process trust boundary as the agents. The OS introduces a mandatory enforcement boundary organized into four pillars—Identity, Perception, Cognition, and Execution—each adapting classical OS security principles to address semantic‑level failures such as prompt injection, memory poisoning, and tool misuse. By wrapping the agent lifecycle in this structured, non‑bypassable framework, AgentKernel aims to provide a unified security layer that can enforce identity, input mediation, memory governance, and execution control across the entire agent lifecycle.
arXiv:2608. 14590v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly perform irreversible real-world actions, including database updates, API calls, file operations, and autonomous use of tools.
arXiv:2602.16708v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As agentic computing systems grow increasingly popular, they raise serious security concerns due to their susceptibility to various attacks....
ActGov is a runtime enforcement framework that validates each action proposed by a large language model (LLM) agent before it interacts with external tools, ensuring that actions stay within task‑scoped authorization boundaries and comply with dynamically constructed policies. It builds policies from tool specifications, benign tasks, and failure traces, verifying updates via SMT‑based counterexample checking. In evaluations on AgentDojo and AgentDyn benchmarks, ActGov consistently reduces indirect prompt‑injection attack success while maintaining task utility, outperforming existing defenses.
VEPA is a framework that enables the verified evolution of formal guardrails for lifelong large language model agents. It represents guardrails as formal policies of symbolic rules over typed agent events, and during deployment uses LLM‑guided feedback to propose policy patches that fix new failures while preserving correct behavior. A deterministic verifier accepts only structurally valid, conflict‑free policies, and an evidence‑aware authority layer activates verified rules only when sufficient supporting evidence exists, ensuring that uncertain updates do not directly affect guardrail decisions.
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly execute long-horizon workflows through external tools, allowing untrusted outputs to influence subsequent actions and exceed user authorization. Existing...
StepGuard introduces a step-level guard model that audits and checks tool actions before execution, addressing security risks in LLM-based agents. It is trained using StepGen, an automatic engine that generates safe and unsafe trajectories, and employs Balance-GRPO to dynamically balance learning between safe and unsafe actions. Experiments show StepGuard achieves high accuracy comparable to GPT-5.4 and significantly reduces attack success rates while minimally impacting utility.