Hugging Face Trending Papers
Falsification-proof non-market allocation mechanisms
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arXiv AI
Oct 15
Falsification-proof non-market allocation mechanisms
The paper examines allocation mechanisms that rely on manipulable characteristics and shows that naive optimal rules lead to falsification and inefficiency. It characterizes optimal falsification‑proof rules across various falsification technologies and identifies an honesty condition under which these rules solve the planner’s unconstrained problem of maximizing a weighted sum of allocative surplus and agents’ welfare.
arXiv AI
Aug 18
Credit Fairness: Online Fairness In Shared Resource Pools
arXiv:2601. 17944v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study repeated allocation of shared resources among agents with time-varying demands and capped linear utilities.
arXiv AI
Oct 15
Improving the Bounds on Approximating Weighted Maximin Share for Chores
arXiv:2610.15520v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We investigate the problem of allocating indivisible chores among agents with arbitrary positive weights and additive nonnegative cost functions. An...
arXiv AI
Jul 31
Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations
arXiv:2406. 12413v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha$-EFX).
arXiv AI
Jul 28
Online Fair Division with Budget Constraints
arXiv:2607. 23310v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints.
arXiv AI
Oct 23
Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness
The paper studies how to allocate indivisible goods to strategic agents with additive valuations without monetary transfers. It investigates whether mechanisms can guarantee pure Nash equilibria while ensuring fairness, focusing on envy‑freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy‑freeness up to any good (EFX). The authors show that the Round‑Robin algorithm yields EF1 allocations at every pure Nash equilibrium, and that a cut‑and‑choose algorithm for two agents produces EFX and maximin share fair allocations in equilibrium, a property absent in the non‑strategic setting.