arXiv:2608.21500v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Prompt injection is listed as the \#1 threat to AI agents. When an agent accesses external data from websites, files, or emails, an attacker may inje...
By Yibo Peng, Long Lian, David Wagner, Sizhe Chen
arXiv:2609. 09404v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic AI frameworks let a language model plan, keep memory, and call tools that reach real files, mail, and services.
By Viet K. Nguyen, Mohammad I. Husain
arXiv:2610.06401v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because they must act on untrusted external content. Existing tr...
By Mohamed Dhouib, Clement Elliker, Alexi Canesse, Ma\"el Jenny, Lucas-Andrei Thil, Mahammed El Sharkawy, Sonia Vanier, Elie Bursztein
arXiv:2609.36570v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that...
By Mark Russinovich
The paper investigates how multimodal large language models are more susceptible to prompt injection when adversarial instructions are presented as text rather than as non-textual inputs like images. It proposes a training‑free defense that renders untrusted payloads into typographic images (or audio) before they reach the model, a method called Pictionary. Experiments on ten models and two benchmarks show that this approach significantly lowers attack success rates while maintaining normal functionality, and that fine‑tuning on image‑rendered instructions can further reduce the modality gap.
By Jie Zhang, Andrei Baroian, Jan N. van Rijn, Avital Shafran, Florian Tram\`{e}r
arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
By Jun Wen Leong