SecOPD: Mitigating Adaptive Prompt Injections by On-Policy Distillation
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arXiv:2507.02735v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Prompt injection attacks, where untrusted data contains an injected prompt to manipulate the system, have been listed as the top security thr...
arXiv:2610.06401v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because they must act on untrusted external content. Existing tr...
arXiv:2606. 26479v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent work (2024 to 2026) has converged on a strategy for defending tool-using LLM agents against indirect prompt injection: rather than training the model to refuse malicious instructions, enforce security outside the model with a deterministic policy that mediates the agent's actions.
arXiv:2609.36570v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that...
arXiv:2606. 15057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents.
arXiv:2608.30207v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Computer use agents (CUAs) are vision-language models that perceive a screen and act on a real operating system through mouse, keyboard, and terminal...