The paper investigates how multimodal large language models are more susceptible to prompt injection when adversarial instructions are presented as text rather than as non-textual inputs like images. It proposes a training‑free defense that renders untrusted payloads into typographic images (or audio) before they reach the model, a method called Pictionary. Experiments on ten models and two benchmarks show that this approach significantly lowers attack success rates while maintaining normal functionality, and that fine‑tuning on image‑rendered instructions can further reduce the modality gap.
By Jie Zhang, Andrei Baroian, Jan N. van Rijn, Avital Shafran, Florian Tram\`{e}r
arXiv:2607.27910v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Inference time defences against vision language model jailbreaks often subtract a calibrated direction from the residual stream at a chosen decoder...
By Xiangyu Yin, Tora Bodin, Rohan Menon, Chih-Hong Cheng
arXiv:2608.30207v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Computer use agents (CUAs) are vision-language models that perceive a screen and act on a real operating system through mouse, keyboard, and terminal...
By Chen Xiong, Zhiyuan He, Pin-Yu Chen, Stjepan Picek, Tsung-Yi Ho
arXiv:2609.35912v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Agent skills are shareable packages of procedural instructions, tools, and examples. Multimodal skills additionally include visual references that ag...
By Lingqi Jiang, Jialuo Chen, Jianan Ma, Xinhao Deng, Xiaohu Du, Sibo Yi, Yuqi Qing, Zhenguang Liu, Qinming He, Shiwen Cui, Changhua Men
arXiv:2609.22949v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Existing prompt injection research focuses on single-model chatbot scenarios, where an attacker manipulates one LLM through crafted input. Multi-agen...
By Rudrendu Kumar Paul, Sourav Nandy
Computer use agents (CUAs) are vision-language models that perceive a screen and act on a real operating system through mouse, keyboard, and terminal, and they are increasingly deployed to automate ev...