arXiv:2606. 03812v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Operational safety in high-stakes domains such as industrial process control, autonomous, and safety-critical systems, demand reliable hazard identification.
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The paper introduces MINT‑Safe, a new open‑source dataset of 11,270 multi‑image dialogues and 500 refusal VQA pairs designed to expose safety risks in multi‑modal large language models during open‑ended conversations. It also proposes TAD‑Align, a turn‑aware dual‑objective reward framework that dynamically up‑weights dialogue turns with inconsistent safety behavior, improving safety metrics on Qwen2.5‑VL‑7B‑Instruct and LLaVA‑Next‑7B. The results show over 10% reduction in attack success rate and notable gains in harmlessness and helpfulness while maintaining overall model performance.
arXiv:2606. 08531v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evolving from simple text-based interaction systems into LLM agents that can maintain memory, use tools, access external environments, and execute tasks.
arXiv:2609.35812v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In-car conversational assistants (ICAs) are increasingly integrated into vehicles to support route planning, vehicle control, and information access. E...
arXiv:2606. 08531v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evolving from simple text-based interaction systems into LLM agents that can maintain memory, use tools, access external environments, and execute tasks.
arXiv:2604. 17301v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Detecting harmful content in multi turn dialogue requires reasoning over the full conversational context rather than isolated utterances.
arXiv:2607. 01153v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model has followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, resisted an embedded command, or misreported progress in an agentic task.