arXiv AI By Rongting Zhang, Martin Bertran, Sandeep Avula, Chia-Jung Lee, Vanessa Murdock

Beyond Instruction Override: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection with Task-Tampering Attacks

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arXiv AI
Oct 28

AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purification

AgentSentry is an inference‑time defense for tool‑augmented large language model agents that mitigates indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. It uses temporal causal diagnostics by performing counterfactual re‑executions at tool‑return boundaries to detect mediator‑sensitive proposals, purifies implicated content, and resumes execution from a sanitized state. Evaluations on AgentDojo show zero successful attacks (ASR = 0%) and an average Utility Under Attack of 76.10%, outperforming baselines while maintaining low false‑positive rates.

By Tian Zhang, Yiwei Xu, Juan Wang, Keyan Guo, Xiaoyang Xu, Bowen Xiao, Quanlong Guan, Jinlin Fan, Jiawei Liu, Zhiquan Liu, Hongxin Hu
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 14

NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operations

arXiv:2607. 10490v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are attractive for network operations, but tickets, alerts, logs, runbooks, and ChatOps messages can carry indirect prompt injections.

By Ruksat Khan Shayoni, Muhammad Faraz Shoaib, S M Asif Hossain, M. F. Mridha