arXiv AI By Rohit Agarwal, Joshua Lin, Mark Braverman, Elad Hazan

AI Alignment via Incentives and Correction

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The paper investigates AI alignment by applying law-and-economics models of deterrence and enforcement to agentic AI pipelines. It frames misbehavior as a strategic trade‑off between gains from violations and the likelihood and cost of detection, leading to a fixed‑point problem where stronger penalties can both deter solvers and reduce auditors’ incentive to inspect. The authors formalize this interaction in a two‑agent model, propose a bilevel reward‑design optimization, and demonstrate that adaptive reward profiles improve oversight and reduce hallucinations in an LLM coding pipeline.

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