arXiv Machine Learning

Learning to Persuade Privately Informed Receivers

arXiv:2607. 28342v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender can influence the behavior of a receiver through strategic information disclosure.

arXiv AI
Jul 10

Provably Optimal Learning Algorithms for Assistance Games

arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.

By Nivasini Ananthakrishnan, Mark Bedaywi, Michael I. Jordan, Stuart Russell, Nika Haghtalab
arXiv Machine Learning
1d ago

Learning to Price with Persuasion

arXiv:2608. 16699v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Motivated by modern marketplaces, where the platform or the seller routinely gathers detailed user profiles, we study a novel learning theoretic model that simultaneously involves information and mechanism design.

By Maria-Florina Balcan, Tejas Pagare, Karan Singh
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 17

PAC Learning in Turn-Based Stochastic Games with Reachability Objectives: A Decentralized Private Approach via Expected Conditional Distance

arXiv:2607. 14877v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reachability is the most fundamental logical objective, yet it is notoriously difficult to learn in reinforcement learning settings: even for Markov decision processes, PAC learning of reachability is impossible without additional assumptions.

By Ali Asadi, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Pavol Kebis
arXiv Machine Learning
1d ago

Dynamic Pricing and Advertising with Demand Learning

arXiv:2304. 14385v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We consider a novel pricing and advertising framework in which a seller not only sets the product price but also designs flexible advertising schemes to influence customers' valuations of the product.

By Shipra Agrawal, Yiding Feng, Wei Tang