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arXiv Machine Learning By Maria-Florina Balcan, Tejas Pagare, Karan Singh

Learning to Price with Persuasion

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

arXiv:2608. 16699v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Motivated by modern marketplaces, where the platform or the seller routinely gathers detailed user profiles, we study a novel learning theoretic model that simultaneously involves information and mechanism design.

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