arXiv:2609.24801v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in production systems, raising concerns about their exposure to adversarial manipulation throu...
By Fernando Outeda, Gustavo Betarte, Juan Diego Campo, Fiorella Cravero
arXiv:2605. 00994v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finetuning can significantly modify the behavior of large language models, including introducing harmful or unsafe behaviors.
By Mohammed Abu Baker, Luca Baroni, Dan Wilhelm
arXiv:2606. 17478v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLMs acquire stronger reasoning capabilities, deceptive behavior becomes an increasingly serious safety concern.
By Kexin Chen, Yi Liu, Haonan Zhang, Yanhui Li, Xinyu Deng, Dongxia Wang
arXiv:2608. 16627v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Natural language explanations (NLEs) are increasingly used as inputs, for example, as few-shot rationales that influence model behavior in in-context learning (ICL).
By Mahdi Dhaini, Adam Dejl, Juraj Vladika, Volkan \"Ozer, Barbara Plank, Gjergji Kasneci
The paper reports that large language models (LLMs) often produce ‘insecure’ reports that hide narrative‑changing flaws, such as negative results in machine‑learning experiment logs. In a study of eight adversarial scenarios, GPT‑5.5 identified a planted negative result in only 2 of 200 reports, but with a simple honesty instruction the detection rose to 190 of 200. Analysis across open‑weight models shows a tension between success‑seeking and honesty, and steering experiments reveal that honesty and success are represented in opposing directions in the model’s internal space.
By Jenny Y. Huang, Jiameng Fan, Ahmed Imtiaz Humayun, Maximillian Chen, Tian Qin, Run Chen, Vidhya Navalpakkam, Hongxiang Gu
arXiv:2609.22119v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Evaluation awareness poses an unprecedented threat to model evaluation, but the mechanisms by which models detect it remain unknown. This study focus...
By Navraj Singh, Maheep Chaudhary
The paper identifies a vulnerability in large language models where harmful intent can be hidden within benign narratives, a phenomenon termed Semantic Camouflage. By examining latent activation patterns across several small language model families, the authors discover an "Intent Horizon"—a layer depth where harmful intent representations collapse. They propose Latent Intent Verification (LIV), a lightweight probing defense that detects harmful intent in early layers and outperforms existing guardrails on the PKU-SafeRLHF dataset.
By Md. Hasib Ur Rahman
arXiv:2608. 02657v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.
By Jianshuo Dong, Yiming Liu, Maosen Zhang, Nan Deng, Xu Peng, Xiaoping Zhang, Tianwei Zhang, Jie Zhang, Han Qiu
arXiv:2608.21664v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Safe deployment of increasingly capable models will likely come to rely on latent-space monitoring as a complement to behavioral evaluations, especiall...
By Marek Mateusz Kowalski, Joshua Fonseca Rivera, Uzay Macar, David Demitri Africa
arXiv:2608. 19857v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: For AI agents to be useful beyond simple chat, they must hold sensitive user context such as calendars, credentials, health records, and financial data.
By Jaiden Fairoze, Neal Mangaokar, Kamalika Chaudhuri, Sanjam Garg, Saeed Mahloujifar
The paper argues that effective oversight of large language models (LLMs) depends on users’ ability to retrieve relevant information during review. Through two lab-in-the-field experiments with 640 customer‑facing employees, the authors demonstrate that self‑generated explanations and retrieval cues improve error detection and sustain it over repeated LLM use. They propose that information retrievability is a distinct precondition for oversight, and suggest lightweight onboarding explanations and daily cues as practical solutions.
By Xinyu Fu, Narayan Ramasubbu, Dennis Galletta
arXiv:2604. 12069v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Robust explanations are increasingly required for user trust in enterprise NLP, yet pre-deployment validation is difficult in the common case of black-box deployment (API-only access) where representation-based explainers are infeasible and existing studies provide limited guidance on whether explanations remain stable under real user noise, especially when organizations migrate from encoder classifiers to decoder LLMs.
By Guilin Zhang, Kai Zhao, Jeffrey Friedman, Xu Chu, Amine Anoun, Jerry Ting