The paper identifies a vulnerability in large language models where harmful intent can be hidden within benign narratives, a phenomenon termed Semantic Camouflage. By examining latent activation patterns across several small language model families, the authors discover an "Intent Horizon"—a layer depth where harmful intent representations collapse. They propose Latent Intent Verification (LIV), a lightweight probing defense that detects harmful intent in early layers and outperforms existing guardrails on the PKU-SafeRLHF dataset.
By Md. Hasib Ur Rahman
arXiv:2606. 17478v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLMs acquire stronger reasoning capabilities, deceptive behavior becomes an increasingly serious safety concern.
By Kexin Chen, Yi Liu, Haonan Zhang, Yanhui Li, Xinyu Deng, Dongxia Wang
arXiv:2606. 25476v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across natural language processing tasks, yet their deployment in high-stakes applications raises critical concerns regarding reliability, safety, and trustworthiness.
By Abrar Alotaibi, Raed Mughus, Moataz Ahmed
The study investigates whether large language models (LLMs) can reliably detect when their own responses have been manipulated by adversarial prefill attacks. Across ten instruction‑tuned LLMs ranging from 3B to 70B parameters and four safety benchmarks, none consistently recognized compromised outputs, with models claiming intent on prefilled responses at an average of 25.3%. The research identifies that introspective signals mainly arise from safety reasoning and refusal, and that training to improve introspection can paradoxically increase attack success, underscoring the fragility of LLM self‑reporting in safety contexts.
By Quang Minh Nguyen, Uzair Ahmed, Taegyoon Kim
arXiv:2606. 07237v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in healthcare for tasks such as clinical question answering, diagnosis support, and report summarization.
By Mahdi Alkaeed
arXiv:2606. 10852v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM deception is often evaluated through direct markers such as fabricated claims, explicit lies, or strategic concealment.
By Polydoros Giannouris, Mohsinul Kabir, Sophia Ananiadou
arXiv:2608. 11624v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persuasion is a core dynamic of natural language communication, shaping how large language models (LLMs) update beliefs, resolve disagreements, and reach decisions.
By Nimet Beyza Bozdag, Emre Can Acikgoz, Gokhan Tur, Dilek Hakkani-T\"ur
Persuasion is a core dynamic of natural language communication, shaping how large language models (LLMs) update beliefs, resolve disagreements, and reach decisions. As LLMs increasingly debate, advise, and think collaboratively with humans and each other, resistance to harmful persuasion becomes a core requirement for reliable behavior.
Large language models (LLMs) frequently produce confident yet factually incorrect responses when user inputs contain misleading premises, a phenomenon we attribute to fact perturbations in the input....
arXiv:2606. 21678v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Language models can generate plausible rationales for their predictions, but these explanations may not faithfully represent the model's internal reasoning.
By Vatsal Ananthula, Adarsh Kumarappan
The paper introduces DEDUCE, a three‑stage framework that turns large language models into proactive error correctors by detecting input fact errors, devising correction strategies, and delivering reliable answers. It also presents MisFactQA, a dataset of factual errors, and new metrics for robustness evaluation. Experiments on TruthfulQA, FalseQA, and MisFactQA show significant gains in accuracy and error correction across Qwen, LLaMA, and Gemma models.
By Ping Wang, Xiangguo Sun, Bingbing Xu, Guocong Li, Xiaofeng Meng
arXiv:2607. 20449v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLMs are trained predominantly on human-authored text, yet the structural and narrative conventions embedded in that text are rarely examined as a source of systematic behavioral influence, or as a governance risk in deployed systems.
By Adam Rigby, Raz Saremi, Azadeh Sohrabinejad, Mehdi Rahimi