arXiv:2608. 02657v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.
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arXiv:2608.02657v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.g., malicious side-tasks hidden in external tool results. While man...
arXiv:2608.30362v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents take real-world actions through tools, indirect prompt injection (IPI) has emerged as a serious threat. The standard metric, Attack Succe...
The paper proposes universal, tool‑based defenses for large language model agents that use external tools, addressing four types of adversarial attacks: direct and indirect prompt injection, memory poisoning, and backdoor attacks. Two main defenses are introduced: Attacker Tool Filtering, which uses anomaly detection to remove suspicious tools, and Normal Tool Recalling, which restores the agent’s original toolset before planning. The authors also add prompt‑based defenses such as Chain‑of‑Thought prompting and self‑reflection, and demonstrate that these methods dramatically lower attack success rates—often to 0%—across multiple open‑source and proprietary LLMs while maintaining or improving task performance.
The paper introduces covert indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks on tool‑using large language model agents, distinguishing between covert and overt successes. It defines new metrics—Covert Success Rate (CSR) and Overt Success Rate (OSR)—to capture whether users notice the injection. The authors propose ICoA, an attack that steers agents back to the user’s task after executing the injection, achieving higher CSR than existing methods on four target models.
arXiv:2607. 26998v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents automate penetration testing through an observation-action loop, selecting actions based on observations returned by tools.
arXiv:2606. 10525v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection poses a critical threat to LLM agents that interact with untrusted external data, yet automated attack methods--proven effective for jailbreaking--remain underexplored in realistic agentic settings.