arXiv:2607. 20436v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluations often assume that behavior observed during testing reflects behavior in ordinary use, but fine-tuning can break this assumption.
arXiv:2607. 11475v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models can be fragile under fine-tuning, as even benign task adaptation may increase harmful compliance.
Safety alignment in large language models can be fragile under fine-tuning, as even benign task adaptation may increase harmful compliance. Existing defenses mainly follow two directions: they either intervene during or after fine-tuning through retraining or weight modification, which can be costly and may hurt task performance, or they use model-agnostic safety classifiers, which may miss failures specific to a given fine-tuned checkpoint.
arXiv:2606. 07808v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reasoning language models deployed in agentic workflows must follow an instruction hierarchy: when instructions from different sources conflict, the model should obey the highest-privilege applicable instruction.
arXiv:2607. 16345v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern agentic systems increasingly rely on skills: installable packages of natural language and code that teach an LLM agent to perform a domain task.
arXiv:2604. 16706v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Automated evaluation of tool-using large language model (LLM) agents is widely assumed to be reliable, yet this assumption is rarely validated against human annotation.
arXiv:2607. 28545v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models can write, patch, and search code, but oncall root cause analysis (RCA) demands something different: reasoning over noisy metrics, logs, traces, and source code, starting from ambiguous user-facing reports, often hours after the incident began.
arXiv:2606. 01695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Adversaries can implant latent harmful behavior by poisoning as few as 1% of fine-tuning examples.
arXiv:2606. 29441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists.
arXiv:2606. 15980v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Activation monitors-lightweight probes trained on a language model's internal representations-are an increasingly common layer in deployment safety stacks.
arXiv:2608. 02786v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI systems can fail silently.
arXiv:2505. 14300v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: White-box monitoring is increasingly adopted as an auditing tool as Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed in daily operations to ensure safe model behavior.
arXiv:2605. 00994v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finetuning can significantly modify the behavior of large language models, including introducing harmful or unsafe behaviors.