arXiv Machine Learning

ZK-Trace: Certified Collusion Tracing with Zero-Knowledge Credentials for Federated GNSS Interference Monitoring

arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 24

RouteScan: A Non-Intrusive Approach to Auditing MoE LLMs Safety via Expert Routing Telemetry

RouteScan is a non‑intrusive auditing framework that detects harmful behavior in Mixture‑of‑Experts (MoE) large language models by analyzing expert‑routing telemetry captured from GPU execution. It uses the number of active GPU threads during the prefilling phase as a micro‑architectural fingerprint to isolate cross‑domain risk indicators and precisely identify malicious prompts. Evaluations on four open‑source MoE LLMs show strong generalization with AUROC > 0.91 on unseen harmful domains, while privacy tests indicate that full prompts cannot be reliably recovered from aggregated telemetry.

By Bo Lv, Zhiheng Xu, KeDong Xiu, Ruyi Ding, Tianhang Zheng, Zhibo Wang, Kui Ren
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 11

CertDW: Towards Certified Dataset Ownership Verification via Conformal Calibration

The paper introduces CertDW, a certified dataset watermark and ownership verification method that remains reliable even under malicious perturbations. By leveraging conformal prediction, it defines two statistical measures—principal probability (PP) and watermark robustness (WR)—to evaluate model stability on benign versus watermarked samples. The authors derive certification conditions linking WR to a PP-based threshold and provide a high‑probability bound on false positives, enabling robust ownership verification when a suspicious model’s WR exceeds the PP values of benign models.

By Ting Qiao, Yiming Li, Jianbin Li, Yingjia Wang, Leyi Qi, Junfeng Guo, Ruili Feng, Dacheng Tao
arXiv AI
Sep 10

Do AI Coding Assistants Check Before They Install? A Pre-Registered Demand-Side Audit of Trust Signals in the Research Software Supply Chain

The study investigates whether AI coding assistants check trust signals before installing software. Researchers pre‑registered a controlled experiment on six open‑source research projects, creating nine modified versions per project with varying trust signals and running 1,920 trials across three models and two operating modes. Results showed that verification of trust signals was almost nonexistent—only 0.5% of trials involved any signal inspection, and no trial executed a verification command, indicating that publishing signals alone does not ensure secure behavior.

By Pengyin Shan