arXiv:2605. 07663v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Data valuation methods allocate payments and audit training data's contribution to machine-learning pipelines; however, they often assume passive contributors.
By Florian A. D. Burnat, Brittany I. Davidson
The paper investigates how federated learning (FL) updates in vehicular edge networks can reveal client identities through gradient-based attacks on inertial sensor data, using the UCI Human Activity Recognition benchmark as a proxy. Experiments show that an honest-but-curious server can identify clients with near-perfect accuracy from unprotected updates. The authors evaluate lightweight defenses—clipping followed by Gaussian noise and ensemble FL—to mitigate this privacy risk while preserving model utility, reporting differential‑privacy budgets and empirical results across multiple attack classifiers and data partitions.
By Ali Akarma (Islamic University of Madinah, Madinah, Saudi Arabia, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia), Toqeer Ali Syed (Islamic University of Madinah, Madinah, Saudi Arabia), Muhammad Khan (University of the West of England, Bristol, U.K), Qurat-ul-ain Mastoi (University of the West of England, Bristol, U.K), Adeel Ahmad (Islamic University of Madinah, Madinah, Saudi Arabia)
arXiv:2608. 15761v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Edge-IIoTset is the reference benchmark for machine-learning intrusion detection in the industrial Internet of Things, and results reported on it cluster above 99%.
By Mostafa M. Galal
arXiv:2606. 08372v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic data is increasingly promoted as a privacy-preserving substitute for releasing sensitive tabular records, yet its central adversarial threat ("reconstruction", the recovery of an individual's hidden attribute values from a synthetic release and a handful of known quasi-identifiers) has been studied only in scattered, hard-to-compare settings.
By Steven Golob, Sikha Pentyala, Martine De Cock
The paper argues that evaluating anonymity in synthetic data generation must focus on the generative model rather than just the resulting dataset. It interprets GDPR definitions of personal data and anonymization under realistic model-access scenarios, mapping these to state‑of‑the‑art privacy attacks. The authors conclude that synthetic data alone is insufficient for anonymization, and that Differential Privacy offers stronger protection than Similarity‑based Privacy Metrics.
By Georgi Ganev, Emiliano De Cristofaro
arXiv:2609.40312v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Lossy compression is widely used in Federated Learning (FL) but is generally treated as an error source, while conventional poisoning defenses inspect...
By Sachi Shome, William Eiers
arXiv:2607. 29221v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We address the challenge of securely and efficiently outsourcing AI computations from a trusted but computationally weak client to an untrusted but powerful server, in the setting where the client holds both the input and the model, and the server must learn neither.
By James Hsin-yu Chiang, Sheila Zingg, Kari Kostiainen, Srdjan Capkun
arXiv:2603. 23171v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Providers monitor deployed large language models (LLMs) to detect misuse that they cannot prevent.
By Toluwani Aremu, Daniil Ognev, Samuele Poppi, Nils Lukas
arXiv:2602.06700v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Graph-structured data underpin a wide spectrum of modern applications, yet their multiple sensitive attributes are not isolated but deeply co...
By Ying Song, Balaji Palanisamy
arXiv:2608.29251v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Privacy protection for live web traffic requires more than detecting private spans. Agent-based privacy protection systems must determine whether an ou...
By Ruiyi Yang, Gayathri Lihinikaduarachchi, Rahat Masood, Flora D. Salim, Salil S. Kanhere
arXiv:2606. 03430v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) deployed in energy infrastructure are vulnerable to model theft attacks, which allow adversaries to create evasive traffic offline.
By Maxime Schwarzer, Laurin Holz, Tobias Huerten, Johannes Loevenich, Thies Moehlenhof, Roberto Rigolin F. Lopes, Veit Hagenmeyer
arXiv:2606. 26373v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dense embeddings power semantic search and retrieval-augmented generation, but embedding-inversion attacks can reconstruct source text from a vector: when a vector database leaks, the documents behind it leak too.
By Sergey Kurilenko