arXiv AI

Even More Deception: Objective Misalignment in Mixed-Motive LLM Multi-Agent Systems

arXiv:2607. 26120v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs)-powered multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed in mixed-motive environments, where agents operate under asymmetric information and strategic deception due to conflicting or hidden objectives.

arXiv AI
Sep 18

Communication and Verification in LLM Agents towards Collaboration under Information Asymmetry

The paper investigates how Large Language Model (LLM) agents can collaborate on a shared task under information asymmetry, using a table‑top version of Einstein Puzzles. It introduces a fine‑tuning‑plus‑verifier framework that equips agents with communication strategies and environmental verification signals. Results show that aligned communication is crucial for rule understanding and human trust, while a verifier improves task comprehension and promotes safer, interpretable collaboration.

By Run Peng, Ziqiao Ma, Amy Pang, Sikai Li, Zhang Xi-Jia, Yingzhuo Yu, Cristian-Paul Bara, Joyce Chai
arXiv AI
Aug 25

CONSCIENTIA: Can LLM Agents Learn to Strategize? Emergent Deception and Trust in a Multi-Agent NYC Simulation

arXiv:2604.09746v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent e...

By Aarush Sinha, Arion Das, Soumyadeep Nag, Charan Karnati, Shravani Nag, Chandra Vadhan Raj, Aman Chadha, Vinija Jain, Suranjana Trivedy, Amitava Das
arXiv AI
Sep 21

Why Do LLMs Struggle in Strategic Play? Broken Links Between Observations, Beliefs, and Actions

The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) struggle in strategic decision-making under incomplete information. It identifies two key gaps: an observation‑belief gap where LLMs’ internal representations of game states are accurate but brittle, and a belief‑action gap where converting these internal beliefs into actions is weak, leading to suboptimal payoffs. Experiments with Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt‑oss confirm that acting optimally on decoded beliefs would improve outcomes in most games, highlighting a bottleneck in belief‑to‑action conversion.

By Jan Sobotka, Mustafa O. Karabag, Ufuk Topcu