arXiv:2606. 27443v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Personality prompting shapes how large language models communicate, yet whether these behavioral shifts affect objective task outcomes remains under-explored.
By Aryan Keluskar, Amrita Bhattacharjee, Huan Liu
arXiv:2511. 04500v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as decision-making agents in high-stakes domains and as imitators of human behavior in the social and behavioral sciences.
By Andrea Cera Palatsi, Samuel Martin-Gutierrez, Ana S. Cardenal, Max Pellert
arXiv:2510. 20963v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Multi-agent debate (MAD) was proposed as a promising approach for ensembling the wisdom of multiple large language models (LLMs) to improve reasoning and provide effective supervision to superhuman LLMs.
By Yongqiang Chen, Gang Niu, James Cheng, Bo Han, Masashi Sugiyama
arXiv:2608. 08199v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly involved in group decision-making with other LLMs and humans.
By Wenwen He, Wenke Huang, Wei Yang Bryan Lim, Dacheng Tao
Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems (MAS) have demonstrated great potential in solving tasks with execution complexity, by distributing subtasks across cooperative agents. However, this divide-and-conquer paradigm falls short on decision-making tasks that are also prevalent in the real world.
arXiv:2606. 27909v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Theory-of-mind evaluations of large language models typically use dyadic social-deduction games, where every observable cue points to a single hidden side, so a model with strong language priors can score well without ever simulating opponents' incentives.
By Avni Mittal
arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.
By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin
arXiv:2507. 19593v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Classical game-theoretic models typically assume rational agents, complete information, and common knowledge of payoffs - assumptions that are often violated in real-world MAS characterized by uncertainty, misaligned perceptions, and nested beliefs.
By Vince Trencsenyi, Agnieszka Mensfelt, Kostas Stathis
arXiv:2604. 08169v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Alignment in LLMs is more brittle than commonly assumed: misalignment can be induced by adversarial prompts, benign fine-tuning, emergent misalignment, and goal misgeneralization.
By Niklas Herbster, Martin Zborowski, Alberto Tosato, Gauthier Gidel, Tommaso Tosato
arXiv:2510. 10813v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to domains that require reasoning about other agents' behavior, such as negotiation, policy design, and market simulation.
By Enric Junque de Fortuny, Veronica Roberta Cappelli
arXiv:2606. 30454v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as agents in simulations of social systems, yet it remains unclear when their behavior can be interpreted as a faithful proxy for human decision-making.
By Henrique Ferraz de Arruda, Carlos Gracia L\'azaro, Alberto Aleta, Yamir Moreno
arXiv:2606. 08310v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as long-horizon agents with decision-making capacities.
By John Chen, Sihan Cheng, Can Gurkan, H M Abdul Fattah