arXiv AI By Sepehr Ilami, Babak Heydari

Steering Emergent Behavior in Multi-Agent LLM Systems via Information Networks

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The paper investigates how to design the observation network among identical large language model (LLM) agents to improve collective welfare in group-decision games. By adding directed observation links that reveal peers’ past actions, the authors study how much information to share and which agents should observe each other across 1,080 episodes and six game types. Their findings show that the value of information depends on alignment between individual and collective goals, and that at a fixed budget the specific wiring of observations can either mitigate or amplify harmful behavior, challenging the assumption that full transparency is always beneficial.

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