The paper proposes a new framework for collective information engines that rely on role differentiation rather than consensus. By modeling anti‑coordination games, agents infer roles from noisy social signals tied to persistent identities, and role‑following actions reinforce those identities, creating a feedback loop that can drive collective order. The authors show that when a social loop gain—determined by identity persistence, cognitive capacity, channel fidelity, and schema strength—exceeds one, roles emerge in a bifurcation cascade whose type is selected by resource‑driven replicator dynamics, offering a mechanistic basis for distributional AGI takeoff and a control lever for platform design.
By Maximilian Puelma Touzel
arXiv:2609.35928v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Multi-agent LLM systems increasingly mix models from several providers, yet exposing each agent's underlying model identity to its peers significantl...
By Xavier Del Giudice, Alessio Palma, Matteo Migliarini, Fabio Galasso, Indro Spinelli
arXiv:2606. 30454v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as agents in simulations of social systems, yet it remains unclear when their behavior can be interpreted as a faithful proxy for human decision-making.
By Henrique Ferraz de Arruda, Carlos Gracia L\'azaro, Alberto Aleta, Yamir Moreno
arXiv:2610.32726v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) increasingly operate as interconnected agents, a fundamental question emerges: does individual cooperation translate...
By Maria Sampani, Maria Lymperaiou, Angeliki Dimitriou, Giorgos Filandrianos, Chrysoula Zerva, Giorgos Stamou
arXiv:2608.22152v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Multi-agent systems built from large language models are deployed widely, yet how much performance is lost when two LLMs must coordinate rather than ac...
By Weixiang Sun, Zehong Wang, Hong Huang, Colby Nelson, Yanfang Ye
arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.
By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin
arXiv:2608.23541v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Does multi-agent LLM interaction help or hurt? Some work reports gains from debate (Du et al., 2024), critique loops (Chen et al., 2025), and mixture...
By Summer Eunhyung Ann, Haokun Liu, Chenhao Tan
Language-model agents favor their own group because they have watched their members favor each other. The group label alone does little once the decision has a cost; what drives favoritism is observed...
arXiv:2607. 15053v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The Internet taught us that the value of a network depends on \emph{how} its nodes connect: broadcast stars scale as $V\!
By Mu Yuan, Jinke Song, Zhaomeng Zhou, Lan Zhang
The Flag Game is a toy model designed to study how AI agents form collective beliefs. In the game, each agent sees only a private crop of a hidden country flag and can share beliefs with peers, leading to complex phenomena such as non‑monotonic performance scaling, accuracy gains from social awareness, and polarization that degrades performance at large population sizes. The authors introduce social circuit attribution to identify key agents and views, and develop a statistical mechanical theory to explain collective belief collapse and polarization in larger populations.
By Elizabeth Pavlova, Hidenori Tanaka
arXiv:2607. 26120v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs)-powered multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed in mixed-motive environments, where agents operate under asymmetric information and strategic deception due to conflicting or hidden objectives.
By Marylou Fauchard, Florian Carichon, Margarida Carvalho, Golnoosh Farnadi
Language‑model agents tend to favor members of their own group because they observe group members favoring each other. When a cost is attached to giving points, the simple group label no longer drives favoritism; instead, interaction history becomes the primary source of bias, with agents extending favoritism to strangers who share the same label. Stronger models prioritize an individual’s own record over group norms, and scripted histories can reduce or reverse favoritism under egalitarian conditions.
By Yujiao Chen