arXiv AI

Steering Emergent Behavior in Multi-Agent LLM Systems via Information Networks

The paper investigates how to design the observation network among identical large language model (LLM) agents to improve collective welfare in group-decision games. By adding directed observation links that reveal peers’ past actions, the authors study how much information to share and which agents should observe each other across 1,080 episodes and six game types. Their findings show that the value of information depends on alignment between individual and collective goals, and that at a fixed budget the specific wiring of observations can either mitigate or amplify harmful behavior, challenging the assumption that full transparency is always beneficial.

arXiv AI
Sep 12

Role differentiation as ignition of a collective information engine: Structuration in Agent Populations

The paper proposes a new framework for collective information engines that rely on role differentiation rather than consensus. By modeling anti‑coordination games, agents infer roles from noisy social signals tied to persistent identities, and role‑following actions reinforce those identities, creating a feedback loop that can drive collective order. The authors show that when a social loop gain—determined by identity persistence, cognitive capacity, channel fidelity, and schema strength—exceeds one, roles emerge in a bifurcation cascade whose type is selected by resource‑driven replicator dynamics, offering a mechanistic basis for distributional AGI takeoff and a control lever for platform design.

By Maximilian Puelma Touzel
arXiv AI
Jul 7

CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas

arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.

By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin
arXiv AI
Sep 17

Flag Game: A Toy Model for Mechanistic Swarm Interpretability

The Flag Game is a toy model designed to study how AI agents form collective beliefs. In the game, each agent sees only a private crop of a hidden country flag and can share beliefs with peers, leading to complex phenomena such as non‑monotonic performance scaling, accuracy gains from social awareness, and polarization that degrades performance at large population sizes. The authors introduce social circuit attribution to identify key agents and views, and develop a statistical mechanical theory to explain collective belief collapse and polarization in larger populations.

By Elizabeth Pavlova, Hidenori Tanaka
arXiv AI
Oct 9

Why LLM Agents Favor Their Group: Stakes, Observed Norms, and Reputation

Language‑model agents tend to favor members of their own group because they observe group members favoring each other. When a cost is attached to giving points, the simple group label no longer drives favoritism; instead, interaction history becomes the primary source of bias, with agents extending favoritism to strangers who share the same label. Stronger models prioritize an individual’s own record over group norms, and scripted histories can reduce or reverse favoritism under egalitarian conditions.

By Yujiao Chen