arXiv:2606. 02423v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can serve as helpful assistants, yet they can equally function as harm amplifiers that enable malicious users to achieve harmful outcomes beyond their capabilities through extended interactions.
By Ruohao Guo, Wei Xu, Alan Ritter
The paper introduces a counterfactually anchored evidence attribution approach for multi‑turn large language model safety failures. It presents a new dataset of 1,762 conversations, including adversarial, benign twins, and high‑risk vocabulary variants, and trains a lightweight hierarchical model that accurately predicts safety violations and attributes them to specific user turns and token spans. The model achieves high detection performance (F1 = 0.988) and significantly reduces adversarial confidence when top‑attributed tokens are removed, while maintaining low false‑positive rates on benign conversations.
By Srinivasan Subramanian, Kazi Aminul Islam, Md. Abdullah Al Hafiz Khan
arXiv:2606. 03812v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Operational safety in high-stakes domains such as industrial process control, autonomous, and safety-critical systems, demand reliable hazard identification.
By Sanjay Das, Ran Elgedawy, Ethan Seefried, Ryan Burchfield, Tirthankar Ghosal
arXiv:2607. 19361v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Most safety guardrails for large language models (LLMs) evaluate each prompt-response pair in isolation, which misses failures that arise only over a dialogue as benign turns compose into harm.
By Sanjay Mishra, Divya Chukkapalli, Ganesh R. Naik
The paper introduces MINT‑Safe, a new open‑source dataset of 11,270 multi‑image dialogues and 500 refusal VQA pairs designed to expose safety risks in multi‑modal large language models during open‑ended conversations. It also proposes TAD‑Align, a turn‑aware dual‑objective reward framework that dynamically up‑weights dialogue turns with inconsistent safety behavior, improving safety metrics on Qwen2.5‑VL‑7B‑Instruct and LLaVA‑Next‑7B. The results show over 10% reduction in attack success rate and notable gains in harmlessness and helpfulness while maintaining overall model performance.
By Han Zhu, Jiale Chen, Chengkun Cai, Shengjie Sun, Haoran Li, Yujin Zhou, Chi-Min Chan, Pengcheng Wen, Lei Li, Yike Guo, Sirui Han
arXiv:2606. 10380v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world crisis intervention is inherently conversational, yet existing research largely focuses on static texts.
By Grace Byun, Abigail Lott, Rebecca Lipschutz, Sean T. Minton, Elizabeth A. Stinson, Jinho D. Choi
arXiv:2603. 03536v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Current LLM-based conversational recommender systems (CRS) primarily optimize recommendation accuracy and user satisfaction.
By Haochang Hao, Yifan Xu, Xinzhuo Li, Yingqiang Ge, Lu Cheng
arXiv:2606. 04867v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI companion platforms such as Replika and Character.
By Yanjing Ren, Reza Ebrahimi, TengTeng Ma
arXiv:2608. 11200v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic dialogue generation offers a way to study conversational dynamics in sensitive domains where real data are difficult to access, release, or annotate.
By Chen Lyu, Xingwei Tan, Simon Cullen, Shelley Wilson, Lois Arthurs, Arshad Jhumka, Gabriele Pergola
The paper introduces CarryOnBench, an interactive benchmark that tests whether large language models can revise their interpretation of user intent and recover utility while staying safe in multi‑turn conversations. Using 398 harmful‑looking queries with benign intents, the benchmark simulates 5,970 conversations across 14 models, evaluating both intent‑aligned utility and safety with a new metric called Ben‑Util. Results show that models often withhold information due to misinterpretation, but most can recover with clarifications, revealing failure modes such as unsafe and redundant recovery that single‑turn tests miss.
By Mingqian Zheng, Malia Morgan, Liwei Jiang, Carolyn Rose, Maarten Sap
Synthetic dialogue generation offers a way to study conversational dynamics in sensitive domains where real data are difficult to access, release, or annotate. The underlying abuse may occur online or offline: threats and coercion can appear directly in messages, while behaviours such as surveillance, isolation, stalking, and physical violence may be planned, disclosed, or referred to conversationally.
arXiv:2608.23152v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Counterspeech effectively neutralizes the impact of online hate. Although prior work explores automated counterspeech generation, it largely emphasizes...
By Sujoy Nath, Aswini Kumar, Tanmoy Chakraborty