arXiv Machine Learning By Ruohao Guo, Wei Xu, Alan Ritter

Investigating and Alleviating Harm Amplification in LLM Interactions

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arXiv:2606. 02423v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can serve as helpful assistants, yet they can equally function as harm amplifiers that enable malicious users to achieve harmful outcomes beyond their capabilities through extended interactions.

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