arXiv:2607. 18828v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Readiness stress-testing of medical AI has focused on closed-ended and multimodal benchmarks.
By Koyar Afrasyab
arXiv:2605. 28734v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: A general-purpose language model that answers a harmful question returns text; a coding model that complies with a malicious request can return a working weapon: a keylogger, ransomware, an exploit that runs as written.
By Richard J. Young, Gregory D. Moody
arXiv:2606. 28332v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for medical and health-related questions, yet their safety in high-risk medical scenarios remains poorly understood.
By Yige Li, Jun Sun, Wei Zhao, Zhe Li, Yutao Wu, Hanxun Huang, Xiang Zheng, Xingjun Ma
arXiv:2608. 16852v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Regulatory compliance monitoring in deployed language models is increasingly implemented as a legal and audit control, checking model outputs against written rules spanning data protection, healthcare, financial regulation, and platform policy.
By Saisab Sadhu, Aadit Sengupta, Vinay Kumar Sankarapu, Pratinav Seth
arXiv:2601. 17642v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Safety alignment in Large Language Models is critical for healthcare; however, reliance on binary refusal boundaries often results in over-refusal of benign queries or unsafe compliance with harmful ones.
By Zhihao Zhang, Liting Huang, Guanghao Wu, Preslav Nakov, Heng Ji, Usman Naseem
arXiv:2607. 28677v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM now pass medical licensing examinations and, in curated cases, can rival physicians at diagnostic reasoning.
By Shayndhan Sivanathan, Shravan Nageswaran, Mehdi Zadem, Ryaan Sultan, Nicolas von Mallinckrodt, Max Solovyev, Alexey Matyushkin, Sumon Sadhu, Gabriele C DeLuca, Sanjeeva Jeyaretna, James Hillis, Manoj Ramachandran, Prakash Jayakumar
arXiv:2606. 29887v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In real-world applications, guardrails are often expected to identify unsafe user-model interactions according to application-specific safety policies, rather than relying on predefined risk taxonomies.
By Jiacheng Zhang, Haoyu He, Sen Zhang, Shen Wang, Xiaolei Xu, Yuhao Sun, Meng Shen, Feng Liu
arXiv:2608. 15673v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model guardrails can be viewed as policy-consistency problems: a system must determine which policy-relevant facts hold in a prompt-response pair and what those facts imply under a given policy.
By Satchit Chatterji, Shihan Wang, Giovanni Sileno, Erman Acar
arXiv:2607. 12792v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak-robustness research typically evaluates safety through generated responses using an LLM-as-judge approach.
By Roman Prosvirnin, Victor Minchenkov, Alexey Soldatov, Vladimir Bashun
arXiv:2509. 02594v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Evaluating large language models (LLMs) on their ability to generate high-quality, accurate, situationally aware answers to clinical questions requires going beyond conventional benchmarks to assess how these systems behave in complex, high-stakes clinical scenarios.
By Sandhanakrishnan Ravichandran, Shivesh Kumar, Rogerio Corga Da Silva, Miguel Romano, Reinhard Berkels, Michiel van der Heijden, Olivier Fail, Valentine Emmanuel Gnanapragasam
arXiv:2608. 03028v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Applying a valid medication-safety rule when its patient-specific conditions are not met can produce an incorrect decision.
By Zhitian Hou, Yuhang Liu, Pengkai Wang, Zeyu Liu, Guanghao Zhu, Zheng Liu, Shuo Cai, Congkai Xie, Zhijie Sang, Kun Zeng, Hongxia Yang
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
By Emre Turan