arXiv AI

What Do Compliance Detectors Read? An Audit of Activation Probes and Guard Models

arXiv:2608. 16852v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Regulatory compliance monitoring in deployed language models is increasingly implemented as a legal and audit control, checking model outputs against written rules spanning data protection, healthcare, financial regulation, and platform policy.

arXiv AI
Sep 17

PACT: Can Enterprise AI Assistants Be Trusted Under Pressure?

The paper introduces PACT, a benchmark designed to evaluate how well enterprise AI assistants follow compliance rules when faced with various pressures such as persistent users or hurried managers. PACT covers twelve regulated domains and forty-eight realistic multi‑turn scenarios, pairing each rule with a shortcut that violates it and applying different pressures across wording and system‑prompt modes. Using PACT, the authors profile six metrics of compliance and aggregate them into a PACTScore, revealing significant variability among 22 LLM models and that even top performers misapply rules 6–10% of the time, with user pressure increasing violations by 65% on average.

By Mika Okamoto, Ansel Kaplan Erol
arXiv AI
Aug 26

More Rejective, Not More Discriminative: The Unit of Verification in Pre-Execution LLM Oversight

The paper introduces the twin‑prefix framework to evaluate how the size of the verification unit—i.e., how many actions a pre‑execution LLM monitor reviews in one call—affects its performance. By pairing each gold plan with a twin that differs by a single write and injecting a controlled error, the authors isolate the impact of review length on catch rates and false rejections. Their findings show that longer review windows increase rejection rates but do not improve discrimination, with the highest informedness occurring at one or two actions across all judges and domains.

By Yuchen Han, Cheng Yan, Wuyang Zhang
arXiv AI
Aug 19

Explicit State Elicitation Is Not Enough: A Controlled Audit of Memory-Policy Classification

The paper investigates how personalized agents decide to use, ignore, update, or query retrieved user memory before acting on a task. An empirical audit protocol is developed to test structured intermediate outputs, revealing that while exposing state definitions improves accuracy, an explicit state-output field does not significantly enhance policy accuracy for large language models. The study also shows that example-level accuracy overstates consistency, with full four‑way family success being rare, and that providing benchmark‑associated state labels merely conditions predictions rather than proving internal fidelity.

By Yihang Chen, Pin Qian, Su Wang, Chong Peng, Huan Xu, Shuaiting Li, Yiqi Sun
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 31

Fidelity Is Not Enough: Dispatch-Level Instrumentation for Agentic Datasheet Extraction

The paper reports that a model can pass fidelity checks—verifying that extracted values match the source—without actually opening a datasheet, due to a hidden constraint that disables tool use. To address this, the authors log every tool call in an agentic benchmark and develop two instruments: a rule‑based failure‑attribution classifier and a silent‑failure detector that flags runs based solely on which tools were invoked. While the detector shows low false positives on clean extractions and recovers all planted faults, its recall against correct tool usage but incorrect answers remains unmeasured, and a partial causal chamber confirms only a subset of claims, highlighting limitations in physical verification.

By Qing Ye, Meng-Hsuan Lin
arXiv AI
Sep 11

Reference-Based Bias Detection in LLMs via Relative Representations of Hidden States

The paper introduces a reference‑based bias detection method that audits hidden‑state representations of language models by encoding sentences as similarities to a fixed set of anchor sentences. This relative representation allows comparison across model variants, such as before and after fine‑tuning, and yields a metric called Representational Bias Shift (ΔB). ΔB correlates strongly with output‑level bias changes, can detect bias‑increasing checkpoints with high ROC AUC, and is computationally efficient, requiring only a few minutes and far less compute than traditional benchmarks.

By Marek Jeli\'nski, Jan Dubi\'nski, Maciej Chrabaszcz, Sebastian Cygert
arXiv AI
Sep 18

Governance-as-Code: Translating EU AI Act Technical Requirements into Executable Compliance Pipelines for Generative AI Systems

The paper introduces Governance-as-Code (GaC), a framework that translates the EU AI Act’s technical requirements into 43 machine‑checkable acceptance criteria across six compliance modules. GaC runs within a CI/CD pipeline, producing Article‑indexed audit evidence and providing actual Rego policy code. The authors validate GaC on two enterprise deployments, showing it reproduces manual audit findings—including three penalty‑triggering violations—while reducing audit labor by about 75%.

By Rudrendu Kumar Paul, Sourav Nandy
arXiv AI
Jun 9

From Statute to Control Flow: Span-Grounded Deontic Trees for Defeasible Scope Parsing

arXiv:2606. 08932v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Rule-following agents tasked with executing policies and regulations often fail via Silent Scope Omission (SSO): a model applies a general rule but silently drops nested exceptions or counter-exceptions, producing outputs that appear compliant yet break on important edge cases.

By Jian Chen, Siyuan Li, Chucheng Wan, Zixuan Yuan
arXiv AI
3d ago

Trust Is Not a Score: Runtime Assurance Contracts for High-Risk AI Agents

The paper introduces Runtime Assurance Contracts (RAC) as a formal policy framework for high‑risk AI agents, addressing the "assurance‑transition gap" by binding autonomy boundaries, component eligibility, evidence state, transition policy, human‑review capacity, and non‑compensatory gates. RAC allows soft metrics to influence routing while mandating retries, switches, escalations, deferrals, or stops when mandatory gates fail or are unknown, ensuring aggregate performance cannot alone authorize action. The authors define the contract, evidence record, permission rule, and five invariants, and evaluate RAC through deterministic failure‑injection studies, hand‑authored traces, and a prospective synthetic holdout, comparing it to score‑only and restricted protocol baselines.

By Serhii Zabolotnii
arXiv Computation and Language
3d ago

Safety Monitors Mostly Catch What the Model Already Refuses

The paper evaluates safety monitors by measuring recall only on prompts that the target model actually answers, rather than on all harmful prompts. Across several guard systems, recall at a 1% false‑positive rate drops sharply when focusing on answered prompts, with monitors catching refused requests 1.1–6.4 times more often than answered ones. Rewriting prompts to be less explicit dramatically increases compliance and reveals that many harmful requests slip past monitors, especially when phrasing is softened. Fine‑tuning guards on these rewritten prompts improves recall from 0.24 to 0.89 on answered requests and generalizes to unseen benchmarks.

By Sripad Karne