In this paper we present an active, constantly updated AI benchmark which measures the integrity of frontier language models against being co-opted for state-backed information operations. We draw on over 2,100 information operations from a live monitoring pipeline which tracks Russian, Chinese and Iranian state-backed information assets.
arXiv:2607. 25648v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Public services face growing pressure to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) to close the gap between rising demand and falling resources.
By Sam Relins, Daniel Birks
arXiv:2607. 22671v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Foundation-model safety benchmarks capture the AI risks of their time of publication: as models improve and governments pass new AI-safety legislation, their risk taxonomies become incomprehensive and their attack prompts become ineffective.
By Rohan Naphade, Minzhou Pan, Bo Li
The paper investigates whether existing AI safety benchmarks, designed for large language models, are suitable for evaluating small language models (SLMs). By testing five benchmark suites on 26 open‑source SLMs with a unified scoring rubric, the authors find that ambiguous judgments dominate, especially for complex prompts and certain architectures. This ambiguity, linked to factors like lexical density and output perplexity, undermines the reliability of aggregate leaderboards and reveals a confound between model capability and perceived safety.
By Nyamtulla Shaik, Fengjun Li, Bo Luo
arXiv:2607. 17883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Enterprises will not deploy AI agents they cannot trust, and the most-cited reason for distrust is hallucination: confident, fluent output that is simply not true.
By Bogdan Raduta, Horia Velicu, Alexandru Preda, Serban Chiricescu
The paper argues that modern inference pipelines add an unseen layer of control between a language model’s frozen weights and its output, altering probability distributions before token selection. It introduces the concepts of the Inference Attribution Problem, Probability Placement, and Inference Policy Transparency to describe how such interventions can bias generated language toward specific frames and how these biases cannot be traced solely to model weights. The authors discuss the governance, security, and economic implications of these undisclosed inference policies, referencing EU AI Act, Digital Services Act, and FTC doctrines.
By Augusto Camargo
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.
By Genliang Zhu (Accentrust, Georgia Institute of Technology), Chu Wang (Accentrust, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
arXiv:2609.37457v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Enterprise artificial-intelligence agents increasingly call tools, modify infrastructure, and process protected data, creating a need to separate actio...
By Kabeh Mohsenzadegan, Vahid Tavakkoli, Kyandoghere Kyamakya
arXiv:2609.08789v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Frontier AI developers publish safety frameworks that commit them to evidencing whether their models are dangerous. The European Union and California...
By Louis Yiven Zhu
arXiv:2606. 11063v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI control protocols oversee untrusted models by monitoring their actions and modifying potentially unsafe steps, often using a trusted model.
By Joachim Schaeffer, Thomas Jiralerspong, Alexander Panfilov, Guillaume Lajoie, Jonas Geiping, Yoshua Bengio, Roland S. Zimmermann
arXiv:2607. 19292v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios.
By Gjergji Kasneci, Enkelejda Kasneci
The paper introduces the concept of "linguistic illegibility," describing how a large language model’s (LLM) language outputs and extracted linguistic features may not accurately reflect its internal computations. It argues that because LLMs compute primarily in activation spaces, any reliance on linguistic self‑reporting for security—such as chain‑of‑thought monitoring or constitutional self‑critique—cannot be fully reliable. The authors propose taint tracking and other sandboxing techniques that do not depend on the model’s linguistic state as a more robust security foundation.
By James Mickens