arXiv Machine Learning By James Mickens

The Implications of Linguistic Illegibility for LLM Security

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

The paper introduces the concept of "linguistic illegibility," describing how a large language model’s (LLM) language outputs and extracted linguistic features may not accurately reflect its internal computations. It argues that because LLMs compute primarily in activation spaces, any reliance on linguistic self‑reporting for security—such as chain‑of‑thought monitoring or constitutional self‑critique—cannot be fully reliable. The authors propose taint tracking and other sandboxing techniques that do not depend on the model’s linguistic state as a more robust security foundation.

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