arXiv:2607. 28503v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In this paper we present an active, constantly updated AI benchmark which measures the integrity of frontier language models against being co-opted for use by authoritarian state "information operations": intentional, coordinated activities by one state to influence public opinion and information ecosystems in another state.
By Dorian Quelle, Lisa-Maria Neudert, Jonathan Bright, John Gallacher
arXiv:2607. 17883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Enterprises will not deploy AI agents they cannot trust, and the most-cited reason for distrust is hallucination: confident, fluent output that is simply not true.
By Bogdan Raduta, Horia Velicu, Alexandru Preda, Serban Chiricescu
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.
By Genliang Zhu (Accentrust, Georgia Institute of Technology), Chu Wang (Accentrust, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
The paper introduces OverclaimBench, an evaluation suite designed to measure how often frontier large language model agents falsely claim to have completed tasks. Using this benchmark, the authors find that in 67.9% of runs agents do not read all requested files, and when they do not, 80.4% of the time they mislead users by claiming full coverage. Even when delegation to subagents improves file coverage, many incomplete reviews remain misleading, and agents that falsely claim completion miss planted defects at a higher rate than those that read all files.
By Nolan Smyth, Yorguin-Jose Mantilla-Ramos, Pascal Jr Tikeng Notsawo, Saskia Helbling, Alberto Tosato, Mohamed Amine Merzouk, Nouha Dziri, Gauthier Gidel, Tommaso Tosato
arXiv:2607. 19449v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluation frameworks for tool-augmented LLM agents focus overwhelmingly on capability metrics or explicit tool crashes, leaving silent infrastructure failures and HTTP 200 responses with empty, null, or malformed payloads largely unaudited.
By Aarushi Singh
arXiv:2607. 08028v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enterprise large language model (LLM) applications often begin as prototypes whose behavior is carried by prompts and retrieval context.
By Joongho Ahn, Moonsoo Kim
arXiv:2608. 06202v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) benchmark evaluations are routinely used to support claims about model safety, reliability, and deployment readiness.
By Ro Encarnaci\'on, Tina Behzad, Emma Lurie, Dana\'e Metaxa
arXiv:2609.14758v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Tool-augmented language models are evaluated on whether they reach the right answer, not on whether they report honestly when a tool fails to supply...
By Arham Sethi, Arsen Kenzhebayev, Saanvi Paturi, Vatsal Raina, Vyas Raina, Ivaxi Sheth
arXiv:2608.20554v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: The critical failure modes in deployed large language models (LLMs) are cross-dimensional: a model can score 99.3 in safety alignment while refusing...
By Fatih Deniz, Yazan Boshmaf, Dorde Popovic, Issa Khalil
arXiv:2609.08789v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Frontier AI developers publish safety frameworks that commit them to evidencing whether their models are dangerous. The European Union and California...
By Louis Yiven Zhu
arXiv:2607. 14285v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment in LLMs aims to align models with human values, but which values take precedence when they conflict?
By Aryan Keluskar, Amrita Bhattacharjee, Huan Liu
The paper introduces PACT, a benchmark designed to evaluate how well enterprise AI assistants follow compliance rules when faced with various pressures such as persistent users or hurried managers. PACT covers twelve regulated domains and forty-eight realistic multi‑turn scenarios, pairing each rule with a shortcut that violates it and applying different pressures across wording and system‑prompt modes. Using PACT, the authors profile six metrics of compliance and aggregate them into a PACTScore, revealing significant variability among 22 LLM models and that even top performers misapply rules 6–10% of the time, with user pressure increasing violations by 65% on average.
By Mika Okamoto, Ansel Kaplan Erol