The paper introduces the concept of "linguistic illegibility," describing how a large language model’s (LLM) language outputs and extracted linguistic features may not accurately reflect its internal computations. It argues that because LLMs compute primarily in activation spaces, any reliance on linguistic self‑reporting for security—such as chain‑of‑thought monitoring or constitutional self‑critique—cannot be fully reliable. The authors propose taint tracking and other sandboxing techniques that do not depend on the model’s linguistic state as a more robust security foundation.
By James Mickens
arXiv:2606. 05256v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This study analyzes a publicly released dataset from a discontinued field experiment on Reddit's r/ChangeMyView.
By Kokil Jaidka, Saifuddin Ahmed
As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified. We present a formal safety argument for the Scientist AI (SAI) Predictor, trained to approximate the Bayesian posterior conditioned on a dataset of "epistemically contextualized" natural-language statements.
arXiv:2606. 29657v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified.
By Yoshua Bengio, Oliver Richardson, Tom\'a\v{s} Gaven\v{c}iak, Michael Cohen, Rory Svarc, Damiano Fornasiere, Gael Gendron, David Hyland, Aton Kamanda, Adam Oberman, Francis Rhys Ward, Anna Gaven\v{c}iak, Jacob Livingston Slosser, Vincent Mai, Iulian Serban, Joumana Ghosn
arXiv:2607. 01208v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language models deployed in high-stakes roles can potentially favor certain entities, brands, or viewpoints, steering user decisions at scale.
By Shayan Talaei, Abhinav Chinta, Devvrit Khatri, Amin Karbasi, Azalia Mirhoseini, Amin Saberi
arXiv:2607. 28503v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In this paper we present an active, constantly updated AI benchmark which measures the integrity of frontier language models against being co-opted for use by authoritarian state "information operations": intentional, coordinated activities by one state to influence public opinion and information ecosystems in another state.
By Dorian Quelle, Lisa-Maria Neudert, Jonathan Bright, John Gallacher