arXiv:2606. 11063v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI control protocols oversee untrusted models by monitoring their actions and modifying potentially unsafe steps, often using a trusted model.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2606. 12747v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-relevant studies of language models, including alignment and jailbreaking evaluations and AI control protocols, often rely on prefilling model outputs.
arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.
arXiv:2603. 00829v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safe deployment of Large Language Model (LLM) agents in autonomous settings requires reliable oversight mechanisms.
arXiv:2605. 06890v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents are promising for high-stakes enterprise workflows, but dependable deployment remains limited because tool-use failures are difficult to diagnose and control.
arXiv:2606. 10487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deploying large language models in user-facing systems requires efficient output safety filtering.
arXiv:2606. 02965v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Benchmarks for autonomous agents measure whether agents complete tasks, yet this framing is systematically blind to whether an agent should have proceeded at all.