arXiv:2606. 24623v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation enhances large language models by incorporating external knowledge, but deploying it in sensitive scenarios risks privacy leakage via malicious prompts.
By Yuanhe Zhao, Tianyu Zhang, Huafei Xing, Derek F. Wong, Jianbin Li, Tao Fang
arXiv:2608.29251v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Privacy protection for live web traffic requires more than detecting private spans. Agent-based privacy protection systems must determine whether an ou...
By Ruiyi Yang, Gayathri Lihinikaduarachchi, Rahat Masood, Flora D. Salim, Salil S. Kanhere
arXiv:2606. 27936v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The widespread collection of fine-grained location data by commercial data brokers creates a re-identification risk that is not widely recognised by the public.
By Oscar Thees, Roman M\"uller, Matthias Templ
The paper investigates how privacy-preserving sanitization of user context in large language model (LLM) interactions affects downstream performance. It identifies three mechanisms—Context‑Dependent Utility, Strategic Adaptation, and Combinatorial Interplay—that explain when and how to sanitize data. Based on these insights, the authors propose an intent‑driven local protection framework using a lightweight model (Veilmind‑4B) to dynamically extract, sanitize, and restore context, achieving lower privacy leakage while maintaining higher utility than existing baselines.
By Zhenhua Liu, Zhanxu Xie, Junjie Yu, Tong Zhu, Lijun Li, Wenliang Chen
arXiv:2608. 03130v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Long-term memory enables persistent personalization in LLM agents, but repeated memory-conditioned responses can cumulatively reveal protected attributes even when they are never stated explicitly.
By Jong Wook Kim, Byoungjae Min, Kennedy Edemacu, Yoonhyuk Choi, Sae-Hong Cho, Beakcheol Jang
The paper investigates privacy risks in agentic AI systems that assemble sensitive data into a hidden context before responding. It introduces context‑inference attacks, a security game that evaluates how well attackers can recover this hidden context under varying levels of knowledge and indirect delivery. Experiments show that even with controls such as instructions not to disclose, logit suppression, and context dilution, agents can leak significant contextual information, achieving high success rates across multiple attack settings.
By Prince Jha, Samuele Poppi, Nils Lukas
The paper introduces SparLeak, a side‑channel attack that exploits a new GPU micro‑architectural leakage called Sparsity‑Induced Memory Access (SIMA) caused by sparse attention in large language models. By capturing SIMA traces during LLM inference, SparLeak can infer user‑query attributes from prefill‑phase traces and reconstruct autoregressive responses from decoding‑phase traces. Experiments on three LLM architectures, three sparse attention mechanisms, and three privacy‑sensitive datasets show high success rates (90.9% for attribute inference and 87.3% for response reconstruction), underscoring the need to address SIMA leakage in sparse‑attention deployments.
By Fahao Chen, Linkang Du, Jinhao Zhou, Peng Li, Zhou Su
The paper systematically studies how anonymizing input data affects large language models (LLMs). Five prominent LLMs were evaluated on eleven benchmarks, comparing performance on original versus pseudonymized inputs. Results show that anonymization generally degrades performance, with larger drops for more capable models and task-dependent effects; reversible anonymization preserves entity uniqueness better than irreversible redaction, and prompting about anonymization offers no benefit.
By Tobias Deu{\ss}er, Max Hahnb\"uck, Lorenz Sparrenberg, Tobias Uelwer, Christian Bauckhage, Rafet Sifa
BodhiPromptShield is a policy‑aware mediation layer for LLM agent pipelines that detects sensitive text spans before they propagate, replacing them with typed placeholders, semantic abstractions, or secure tokens and restoring them only at authorized execution boundaries. In evaluations on AI4Privacy, PrivacyLens, and AgentDojo datasets, the system reduces identifier exposure to 7.4% and 1.8% respectively, and limits exact identifier leakage in final actions to 2.1–3.1%. While mediation preserves factual content according to automated metrics, human annotations show a significant drop in inferability from 100% to 24–53%, indicating the need for human validation of semantic‑leakage measures.
By Bo Ma, Jinsong Wu, Weiqi Yan
arXiv:2609.14003v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Personal AI agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly given access to a user's private data and communications in order to provid...
By Minsun Shim, Ramisha Raida Karim, Ruthwik Jakkula, Kaiwen Zhou, Xin Liu, Xin Eric Wang, Zhou Li
arXiv:2608. 19857v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: For AI agents to be useful beyond simple chat, they must hold sensitive user context such as calendars, credentials, health records, and financial data.
By Jaiden Fairoze, Neal Mangaokar, Kamalika Chaudhuri, Sanjam Garg, Saeed Mahloujifar
arXiv:2606. 09401v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent work has applied differential privacy (DP) to adapt large language models (LLMs) for sensitive applications, offering theoretical guarantees.
By Bart{\l}omiej Marek, Lorenzo Rossi, Vincent Hanke, Xun Wang, Michael Backes, Franziska Boenisch, Adam Dziedzic