arXiv AI By Ruiyi Yang, Gayathri Lihinikaduarachchi, Rahat Masood, Flora D. Salim, Salil S. Kanhere

GuardianAgent: Policy-Conditioned Risk-Adaptive Anonymization with Verified Adversarial Escalation

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arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 11

On the Impact of Anonymization on the Performance of Large Language Models

The paper systematically studies how anonymizing input data affects large language models (LLMs). Five prominent LLMs were evaluated on eleven benchmarks, comparing performance on original versus pseudonymized inputs. Results show that anonymization generally degrades performance, with larger drops for more capable models and task-dependent effects; reversible anonymization preserves entity uniqueness better than irreversible redaction, and prompting about anonymization offers no benefit.

By Tobias Deu{\ss}er, Max Hahnb\"uck, Lorenz Sparrenberg, Tobias Uelwer, Christian Bauckhage, Rafet Sifa
arXiv AI
Sep 12

Demystifying the Privacy-Utility Trade-off in LLM Interactions

The paper investigates how privacy-preserving sanitization of user context in large language model (LLM) interactions affects downstream performance. It identifies three mechanisms—Context‑Dependent Utility, Strategic Adaptation, and Combinatorial Interplay—that explain when and how to sanitize data. Based on these insights, the authors propose an intent‑driven local protection framework using a lightweight model (Veilmind‑4B) to dynamically extract, sanitize, and restore context, achieving lower privacy leakage while maintaining higher utility than existing baselines.

By Zhenhua Liu, Zhanxu Xie, Junjie Yu, Tong Zhu, Lijun Li, Wenliang Chen
arXiv Computer Vision
5d ago

BodhiPromptShield: Pre-Inference Prompt Mediation for Surface-Form Privacy Propagation in LLM Agent Pipelines

BodhiPromptShield is a policy‑aware mediation layer for LLM agent pipelines that detects sensitive text spans before they propagate, replacing them with typed placeholders, semantic abstractions, or secure tokens and restoring them only at authorized execution boundaries. In evaluations on AI4Privacy, PrivacyLens, and AgentDojo datasets, the system reduces identifier exposure to 7.4% and 1.8% respectively, and limits exact identifier leakage in final actions to 2.1–3.1%. While mediation preserves factual content according to automated metrics, human annotations show a significant drop in inferability from 100% to 24–53%, indicating the need for human validation of semantic‑leakage measures.

By Bo Ma, Jinsong Wu, Weiqi Yan