arXiv:2606. 27936v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The widespread collection of fine-grained location data by commercial data brokers creates a re-identification risk that is not widely recognised by the public.
arXiv:2608. 02052v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Human mobility prediction models, which forecast the next location in a user's trajectory, are increasingly deployed in urban analytics, navigation, and personalized services.
arXiv:2606. 25836v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: To better assist users with completing challenging tasks, AI agents mediate communications, access data, and interact with different APIs.
arXiv:2608.29251v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Privacy protection for live web traffic requires more than detecting private spans. Agent-based privacy protection systems must determine whether an ou...
arXiv:2601. 14660v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agentic Large Language Models (LLMs) are models able to reason, plan, and execute tools over unstructured data.
To better assist users with completing challenging tasks, AI agents mediate communications, access data, and interact with different APIs. Many employers (and even nation-states) already provide their users with this technology.
arXiv:2606. 26627v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model agents increasingly query databases, search document collections, call external APIs, remember past interactions, and act on a user's behalf.
The paper investigates privacy risks in agentic AI systems that assemble sensitive data into a hidden context before responding. It introduces context‑inference attacks, a security game that evaluates how well attackers can recover this hidden context under varying levels of knowledge and indirect delivery. Experiments show that even with controls such as instructions not to disclose, logit suppression, and context dilution, agents can leak significant contextual information, achieving high success rates across multiple attack settings.
For AI agents to be useful beyond simple chat, they must hold sensitive user context such as calendars, credentials, health records, and financial data. We study whether the mere presence of such secrets in a model's context window introduces hidden correlations into the model's benign outputs, allowing reconstruction even when the model correctly refuses direct extraction.
arXiv:2606. 30801v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Personalization algorithms determine what content users encounter on online platforms.
The study analyzes 10,211 real scam and spam calls collected by an AI voice‑agent honeypot, revealing that scammers operate on a templated, office‑hour schedule and use disposable numbers to recycle scripts. Callers predominantly seek identity anchors such as home addresses and dates of birth, and the amount of conversation increases with the target’s age, though the requested information remains unchanged. Early detection is feasible, with escalation predictability reaching 0.87 ROC‑AUC by the eighth line using simple bag‑of‑words models.
Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems can expose protected state through internal messages, tool arguments, logs, and persistent memory even when their public outputs appear innocuous. Existing privacy prompts, redaction methods, and source-level access controls restrict surface content or data access, but do not specify what a legitimately informed agent should disclose or how that disclosure may be reused downstream.
arXiv:2606. 09844v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) alter their privacy behavior based on the perceived identity of their interlocutor.