arXiv:2605. 25739v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We prove that no reinforcement learning policy with confidence-gated autonomy can simultaneously achieve maximum helpfulness, optimal calibration, and full autonomy under rational oversight, whenever some tasks exceed the agent's reliable competence: the Behavioral Credibility Trilemma.
arXiv:2606. 15563v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI systems increasingly delegate decisions to specialized models, evaluators, tools, and supervisory controllers.
arXiv:2602. 05459v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Offline goal-conditioned reinforcement learning (GCRL) is typically benchmarked by the best tuned success rate of each method.
arXiv:2608. 05085v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Systems that automate scientific discovery must repeatedly decide which experiment to run, which hypothesis to test, which tool to build, and when to stop.
arXiv:2606. 29654v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent deliberation among LLMs can improve reasoning, but deployment requires deciding when the current answer is reliable enough to act on and when it should be escalated to human review.
Aligned language models routinely misreport under non-evidential incentive pressure: they agree with a confident user or overstate certainty even when their internal belief is unchanged. We cast this as a failure of internal incentive-compatibility (IC) and present a method for learning and certifying counterfactual report mediators that hold a model's reports to a causal contract: invariant to forbidden influences (pressure, prestige, restyling) and responsive to licensed ones (genuine evidence).
arXiv:2607. 12985v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Aligned language models routinely misreport under non-evidential incentive pressure: they agree with a confident user or overstate certainty even when their internal belief is unchanged.
arXiv:2604. 26360v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) systems face a compounding alignment challenge: not only are learned reward models uncertain about unseen state-action pairs, but the human preference annotations they are trained on are themselves inconsistent, context-dependent, and noisy.
arXiv:2608. 07474v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior work showed that human-in-the-loop oversight becomes structurally untenable in high-loss domains when AI output velocity V exceeds human cognitive capacity C_max.
arXiv:2607. 25408v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A growing body of 2026 work applies control theory to LLM agents: Lyapunov-certified stability for tool-mediated controllers (Prinos et al.
arXiv:2608. 14945v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: On-policy self-distillation (OPSD) gives language agents dense token-level supervision from a privileged self-teacher on the policy's own trajectories.
arXiv:2607. 09706v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models turn a worded situation into a numeric plan, and the dominant pipelines (NL4Opt, OptiMUS, ORLM, OR-LLM-Agent) commit to a single objective and point-valued coefficients, then solve once.
arXiv:2606. 18531v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Offline reinforcement learning is typically analyzed under process-level reward supervision, yet many sequential decision datasets record only trajectory-level outcomes.